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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2002, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
announced that the State of New York, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and several other regulatory authorities, had reached a 
“global settlement” in their investigation into the investment banking 
practices of ten major Wall Street investment firms.1  The 
investigation had focused primarily on analyst conflicts of interest: 
the tendency of research analysts to supply unduly optimistic 
forecasts of company performance, under pressure from colleagues 
in the investment banking department who owe their business to the 
very same companies the analysts are touting.2  But when the 
agreements became public nearly a year later,3 one of the more 
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 1 Press Release, Office of the New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, SEC, NY 
Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE, and State Regulators Announce Historic 
Agreement to Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Global 
Resolution Press Release], at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/dec/ 
dec20b_02.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). 
 2 See Press Release, infra note 78.  The conflict arose as a result of inadequate 
segregation of research analysts and investment bankers working within the same 
brokerage house.  See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.  Analysts would 
create hype over a particular company by releasing unduly rosy appraisals of that 
company’s performance.  Id.  In the euphoric investor market of the late 1990s, such 
hype often translated into high investor demand for the stock of that company.  Id.  
Riding this investor groundswell, the company would often increase its demand for 
investment banking services, which generated lucrative fees for the investment 
banking arm of the brokerage house.  Id.  Thus, working in conjunction, research 
analysts and investment bankers were able to generate huge profits for their 
principals.  Id.  At the same time, investors relying on false or misleading analyst 
reports often paid exorbitant prices for stock that should have traded at a fraction of 
its market price at the height of the stock market bubble.  Id. 
 3 See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Court 
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interesting provisions concerned the allocation of shares in initial 
public offerings, or IPOs—a topic that might seem, at first blush, to 
have little bearing on analyst conflicts of interest.  Events of the past 
several years,4 however, have shown that in an environment of lax 
regulatory oversight, IPO allocations often degenerate into a practice 
known as “spinning.”  Spinning, fraught with conflicts of interest of 
its own, reinforces analyst conflicts of interest and threatens investor 
confidence in the overall integrity of financial markets. 
The importance of IPO allocations in general and spinning in 
particular is best illustrated by way of example.  Picture a publicly 
traded security that you, the investor, can buy at 9:30 a.m. for twenty 
dollars and sell later that same day for upwards of ninety dollars.  
Imagine that the security seemingly defies the conventional wisdom 
that with higher yields generally come increased risks.5  To the 
contrary, owning this security poses virtually no risk at all, and, in 
fact, you are practically assured a substantial profit.  Naturally, any 
investor would clamor for the opportunity to purchase such a 
security, and the effect of this competition would drive up the 
security’s price.6  But suppose you have the ability to acquire tens of 
thousands of shares of this security for the guaranteed price of twenty 
dollars each, free from all competitive market forces.  Thus, a single 
transaction may net you millions of dollars in profits.  Now suppose 
that you can repeatedly profit from such transactions, month after 
month, year after year.  As an added bonus, suppose this was all 
perfectly legal. 
While such securities sound like fantasy to the sober investor in 
today’s equity markets, they were commonplace as little as two years 
ago.7  The securities in question are shares in “hot”8 IPOs.  In the 
 
Approves Global Research Analyst Settlement (Oct. 31, 2003) (appending the 
individual settlements reached with each firm), at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/lr18438.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). 
 4 See infra Part I. 
 5 See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 233 (4th ed. 1996) (“[A] 
risk averse investor would never hold the risky asset if it had a lower expected return 
than the risk-free asset.  It follows that if you choose to devote a higher fraction of 
your wealth to the risky asset, you will get a higher expected return, but you will also 
incur higher risk.”).  This phenomenon is well documented in practice.  See FRANK K. 
REILLY & EDGAR A. NORTON, INVESTMENTS 46-47 (4th ed. 1995) (noting that “[a]s 
expected, the higher returns available from equities come at the cost of higher risk,” 
and providing graphical data). 
 6 Rising demand coupled with fixed supply of any given commodity exerts 
upward pressure on price.  See VARIAN, supra note 5, at 7. 
 7 For several years following the dot-com boom, United States financial markets 
have witnessed a sharp decline in the number of initial public offerings.  See Aaron 
Elstein, Economic Surge Rebuilds Altar of Public Offerings, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Dec. 15, 
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hands of skillful financiers, their unique qualities give rise to a host of 
equally unique legal issues.  Foremost among them is the 
controversial issue of “spinning.” 
“Spinning” occurs when an IPO underwriter places shares of a 
hot IPO in the personal account of an individual investor who, in his 
or her capacity as a director or officer of a corporation, can direct 
lucrative corporate business back to the underwriter.9  For several 
years, controversy has swirled as to whether this practice is legal and 
within the underwriter’s discretion, or whether it amounts to an 
illegal bribe of a corporate fiduciary.10  Indeed, policymakers and 
commentators continue to debate the basic question of whether 
spinning should be legal.11  If spinning is legal, questions remain as to 
whether the fiduciary has a duty to disclose the opportunity to the 
corporation before reaping the profits.12 
This Comment examines the controversy surrounding the 
practice of spinning, as well as recent developments in the regulation 
of underwriters.  Part I provides an overview of the mechanics of IPO 
share allocation in general and spinning in particular.  Additionally, 
it surveys some of the recent media attention that spinning has 
garnered, which suggests that popular opinion weighs heavily in favor 
of a strict prohibition of the practice.  In Part II, this Comment 
discusses the major arguments against spinning, attempting to shed 
 
2003, at 15.  After a peak year in 1999, with 510 IPOs raising more than $60 billion in 
capital, U.S. markets in 2003 saw fewer than ninety IPOs, raising less than $20 billion 
in the aggregate.  Id. (showing a steady decline in the number of IPOs and aggregate 
capitalization since 1999, and estimating only eighty-four IPOs in 2003 raising 
approximately $15 billion).  But the IPO market appears poised to begin its rebound 
in 2004.  Id. (noting that Richard Peterson, Thompson Financial’s chief market 
strategist, estimates there may be up to two hundred IPOs in 2004, thus ending the 
longest decline in the domestic IPO market since 1975); see also Lucas van Grinsven, 
Tech IPOs Will Be Back with a Vengeance in 2004, REUTERS, Dec. 23, 2003 (predicting 
that 2004 will be a watershed year for European tech company IPOs), at 
http://uk.biz.yahoo.com/031223/80/ehps2.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).  The 
prospect for the return of the IPO market in the near future speaks to the pressing 
concern of some observers that IPOs must be more carefully regulated to prevent 
abuse.  See infra Part II. 
 8 See infra note 47 and accompanying text.  The above hypothetical is admittedly 
sensational but nevertheless is a paradigm example of a “hot” IPO. 
 9 See sources cited infra note 63. 
 10 See infra notes 91-107 and accompanying text. 
 11 See Ermanno Pascutto, Bribery by Another Name: Is IPO Spinning an Immoral 
Practice That Is Undermining Investor Confidence in the Markets, or Harmless Business That 
Should Be Left Alone?, NAT’L POST, Jan. 2, 2003, at FP8 (“In Canada and the United 
States, there is a debate in the media about whether spinning is illegal, unethical, or 
just good business practice.”). 
 12 See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2. 
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light on the reasoning behind recent regulatory interest in this area.  
Next, Part III analyzes the New York Attorney General’s “global 
resolution,” with its putative ban on spinning, and argues that this 
agreement is an incomplete remedy and should be better viewed as a 
stepping-stone to more conclusive and preclusive SEC regulation.  
Finally, Part IV reviews the current alternatives to New York’s “global 
resolution.”  First, it describes the inherent weaknesses of existing 
regulations, and suggests a more certain approach for future 
regulatory efforts.  Then, it suggests that aggrieved shareholders 
should be able to sue corporate fiduciaries for their past spinning 
activities.  To that end, this Comment describes theories of liability 
involving the corporate opportunity doctrine and principles of 
agency law.  Lastly, this Comment presents an alternative method of 
IPO underwriting, the Dutch auction method, and argues that 
broader use of this fledgling technique will obviate many of the 
inefficiencies that encourage spinning in the first place. 
PART I: THE MECHANICS OF SPINNING 
An initial public offering (“IPO”) is a company’s first sale of 
stock to the public.13  It is one of the most important means by which 
corporations raise capital.14  Corporations that undertake IPOs have 
substantial discretion in how to use the resulting funds.15  IPOs also 
provide initial investors a public market in which to cash out their 
shares at some future date.16  Other factors, such as increased 
publicity17 and the “first-mover advantage,”18 may play subsidiary roles 
 
 13 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1111 (7th ed. 1999) (defining an initial public 
offering as “[a] company’s first public sale of stock”). 
 14 See Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 
J. FIN. 1795, 1795 (2002) (noting that between 1980 and 2001, United States markets 
averaged more than one IPO per day, raising a total of $488 billion, or $78 million 
per deal on average). 
 15 Bruce E. Crocker, The Initial Public Offering Process, 955 PLI/CORP. 385, 387 
(1996). 
 16 Ritter & Welch, supra note 14, at 1796. 
 17 Professors Ritter and Welch suggest that the publicity factor is a minor 
consideration, as entrepreneurs are generally reluctant to engage in complex public 
finance mechanisms.  Id. at 1796, 1798.  But Professors Ritter and Welsh may 
underestimate corporate desire for the favorable analyst coverage that often 
accompanies a successful IPO.  See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Strategic IPO 
Underpricing, Information Momentum, and Lockup Expiration Selling, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 
106 (2002) (discussing the role of analyst coverage on IPO share price in the 
aftermarket). 
 18 A corporation may realize additional value from being the first corporation 
within an industry group to go public.  Ritter & Welch, supra note 14, at 1798 (noting 
that commentators often cite Netscape as the archetype). 
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in a corporation’s decision to go public. 
Once the directors of the company going public (the “issuer”) 
decide to pursue an IPO, they typically select a lead underwriter to 
manage the public offering.19  In a typical IPO, the lead underwriter 
is a large broker-dealer, such as Salomon Smith Barney or Goldman 
Sachs, whose guiding function is to make an orderly and bona fide 
distribution of the issuer’s IPO shares to investors.20  Underwriter 
selection may be a highly competitive process21 in which the issuer’s 
board evaluates a number of competing underwriters22 on the basis of 
such factors as experience, the amount of research analyst coverage 
that the underwriter can provide, the strength of the underwriter’s 
sales and trading departments, the underwriter’s credibility with 
investors, and the underwriter’s commitment to a long-term 
relationship with the issuer.23  Often, however, the issuer’s board will 
make an informal selection based upon reputation or prior dealings 
with a particular firm or executive.24 
After the issuer’s board settles on a lead underwriter, the 
underwriter will execute a “letter of intent.”25  Though non-binding,26 
the letter of intent outlines the terms of the services that the 
underwriter expects to provide27 and forms the blueprint of the 
subsequent binding underwriting agreement between the issuer and 
 
 19 See 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL 
CORPORATE LAW § 8:1 (2d ed. 2002).  The lead underwriter, in turn, typically 
assembles a syndicate of secondary underwriters to assist in the transaction.  3A id.  
Note, however, that there is no requirement under either state or federal securities 
law that the issuer conduct its offering through a broker-dealer.  1 WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, 
SECURITIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS § 5:01 (2d ed. 2001). 
 20 1 PRIFTI, supra note 19, § 5.01. 
 21 Crocker, supra note 15, at 393 (“During the final selection process for 
managing underwriters, which is typically conducted by the company’s top executives 
and board of directors, investment banks will compete intensely and can be 
aggressive in promoting their qualifications.”). 
 22 See Therese H. Maynard, Spinning In a Hot IPO—Breach of Fiduciary Duty or 
Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2060 (2002) (stating that it is 
standard practice for a board to interview at least three prospective underwriters). 
 23 Crocker, supra note 15, at 393-94; see 1 PRIFTI, supra note 19, § 5.05 (listing 
fourteen factors that a board might consider). 
 24 See 1 PRIFTI, supra note 19, § 5.01 (“At present, obtaining an underwriter is a 
matter of who you know.”); see also 1 id. § 5.05 (noting that there is no firm regimen 
for selecting an underwriter, and boards will often base their decision on informal 
contacts “such as the accountant, venture capitalist, friends, or perhaps the broker 
with whom you already made a general securities account”).  Frequently, the board 
may select a particular underwriter upon the suggestion of the CEO.  Maynard, supra 
note 22, at 2060. 
 25 1 PRIFTI, supra note 19, § 4.01. 
 26 3A BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 19, § 8:6. 
 27 1 PRIFTI, supra note 19, § 4.01. 
  
1126 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:1121 
underwriter.28  Often, the underwriter’s services will include a 
commitment to purchase all of the issuer’s IPO shares at the offer 
price, minus the underwriter’s fee, or discount.29  Just before the IPO, 
the underwriter will then re-sell the shares to select investors at the 
offer price.30  This so-called “firm commitment” method of 
underwriting thus places the burden of selling the shares on the 
underwriters, and is by far the most common method of underwriting 
in the United States today.31  The letter of intent may also include 
preliminary estimates for the number of shares to be sold and their 
offering price, but the underwriter will not finalize these critical 
terms until it has had a chance to gauge investor demand for the 
issuer’s securities.32 
The most important job of the newly selected lead underwriter is 
to estimate investor demand for the issuer’s IPO shares over a range 
of potential offer prices.33  Since the 1960s, “roadshows” have been an 
important vehicle in this process.34  Roadshow is the term used to 
describe the promotional campaign that brings together the issuer’s 
management and investors who are potentially interested in investing 
 
 28 1 id. (stating that the letter of intent “is the document between the underwriter 
and the issuer from which the underwriting agreement is written”). 
 29 Raymond P.H. Fishe, How Stock Flippers Affect IPO Pricing and Stabilization, 37 J. 
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 319, 322 (2002) (describing this arrangement as a 
“firm-commitment contract”); see 3A BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 19, § 8:5; 1 
PRIFTI, supra note 19, § 4.04 (providing an example of a formal letter of intent in 
which the underwriter commits to purchase the issuer’s offering). 
The National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) regulates the size of 
the underwriters’ discount, which will vary with the size of the offering.  1 id. § 5.01.  
Typically, a $10 million IPO will generate an underwriters’ discount of 10.65%; a $20 
million IPO will generate a 7.42% discount; IPOs above $40 million will generate 
discounts around 7.0% or less; and for IPOs of $50 million or more, the discount will 
be no more than 6.89%.  1 id. 
 30 See Crocker, supra note 15, at 397 (noting that share allocations are finalized 
before public trading commences).  These privileged investors will thus own IPO 
shares when public trading of the IPO shares begins, and are generally free to sell 
them to clamoring individual investors anytime thereafter.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
The IPO Allocation Probe: Who Is the Victim?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18, 2001, at 5 (noting that 
“institutional investors regularly [resell] the shares they buy in IPOs within days or 
weeks of the offering”). 
 31 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 327 (3d ed. 1998) 
(noting that “firm commitment” underwriting is the most prevalent method); see 
Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings Are 
Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 68 n.190 (1993) (stating that firm commitment 
IPOs comprise over ninety-five percent of all IPOs). 
 32 1 PRIFTI, supra note 19, § 4.02. 
 33 Fishe, supra note 29, at 322 (“[T]he underwriter estimates market demand for 
the issue . . . as a function of offer price . . . .”). 
 34 Linda J. Yi, Note, Road Shows On the Internet: Taking Individual Investors for a Ride 
on the Information Highway, 52 DUKE L.J. 243, 247 (2002). 
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in the IPO.35  An IPO roadshow typically consists of a series of 
presentations and face-to-face meetings, spanning the country, and 
open only to select institutional investors such as pension funds and 
mutual funds.36  Investor feedback from these meetings allows the 
underwriter to “build a book” of probable investors.37  Through this 
bookbuilding process, the underwriter assembles a group of investors 
who will then have the opportunity to purchase IPO allotments from 
the underwriter at the offer price during the critical period just 
before public trading begins.38  Investor interest during the roadshow 
also provides the underwriter with a sense of the aggregate market 
demand for the IPO, which allows the underwriter to hone the offer 
price.39 
In theory, the underwriter should arrive at an offer price that 
will maximize the issuer’s returns from the IPO by exploiting the full 
extent of aggregate investor demand.40  Between 1980 and 2001, 
however, IPO share price at the close of the first day of public trading 
on United States equities markets averaged 18.8 percent above the 
offer price, suggesting a pattern of systematic underpricing.41  
Theorists have advanced a number of possible reasons for this 
phenomenon,42 but most concede that the underwriter, who must 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 247-48 (noting that allowing individual investors to participate in 
roadshows would likely violate § 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, which 
prohibits general advertising to investors); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2002).  For 
a flavor of the roadshow experience, see generally Mike Mills, A Digital Age Rite: The 
IPO Roadshow; A Former Post Reporter Chronicles His New Company’s Successful Pitch to 
Underwriters, Regulators, and Investors, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1999, at H1. 
 37 See Lawrence M. Benveniste & Walid Y. Busaba, Bookbuilding vs. Fixed Price: An 
Analysis of Competing Strategies for Marketing IPOs, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
383 (1997); Mills, supra note 36 (describing “the delicate act of balancing ‘the 
book’”). 
 38 See Mills, supra note 36, at H1 (describing the strategy of creating an investor 
syndicate during the roadshow). 
 39 See Benveniste & Busaba, supra note 37, at 390 (“The gathered indications 
[from prospective investors] provide an assessment of the demand for the issue that 
allows the underwriter to set an offer price that better reflects aggregate, or market, 
valuation.”). 
 40 Fishe, supra note 29, at 324; see Laurie Krigman et al., The Persistence of IPO 
Mispricing and the Predictive Power of Flipping, 54 J. FIN. 1015, 1015 (1999) (describing 
the theory as “balancing supply and demand”). 
 41 Ritter & Welch, supra note 14, at 1795; see Aggarwal et al., supra note 17, at 106; 
Krigman et al., supra note 40, at 1015.  Professors Benveniste and Busaba report a 
19.61% average rate of underpricing between 1975 and 1982.  Benveniste & Busaba, 
supra note 37, at 394.  This phenomenon is not unique to United States markets; an 
underpricing rate of approximately fifteen percent is observed across all developed 
countries.  Aggarwal et al., supra note 17, at 106. 
 42 One of the most likely is that the underwriter’s reputation may suffer harm if 
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purchase the issuer’s IPO shares at the offer price, has an incentive to 
underprice.43  Firm commitment underwriting requires the 
underwriter to maintain the share price after public trading of the 
IPO shares has begun.44  If newly issued IPO shares begin to trade 
down, i.e., the trading price drops below the offer price (indicating 
excess supply relative to demand), the firm commitment underwriter 
may have to purchase the excess shares for its own account.45  Rather 
than face this risk of loss, the underwriter may instead underprice the 
IPO, thus effectively shifting the financial burden to the issuer in the 
form of foregone capitalization from the IPO.46  But whether 
deliberate or not, pricing IPO shares well below market demand 
transforms ordinary IPO shares into so-called “hot issues.”47  Traders 
covet shares of “hot” IPOs because they can “flip” the shares—resell 
 
an overpriced IPO yields negative first-day returns.  See Fishe, supra note 29, at 324-
25.  Another theory is that underwriters underprice IPOs as insurance against 
lawsuits alleging violation of federal securities laws.  See Alexander, supra note 31, at 
19 (“Damages in suits brought under the Securities Act of 1933 . . . are based on the 
difference between the offering price and the stock price at the time of suit.  The 
lower the offering price, the lower the potential damages.”) (footnote omitted). 
 43 See, e.g., James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New Issues Market: Empirical 
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 954 n.162 (1996) (noting 
that “several commentators have written on the possible incentive of underwriters to 
underprice an IPO”); Note, Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REV. 
1381, 1390 (1985) [hereinafter Auctioning New Issues] (“In a firm commitment 
offering, the underwriter bears the risk that investors may not buy the securities.  
Underpricing the issue, however, reduces this risk.”). 
One may legitimately ask why an issuer would acquiesce in the underwriter’s 
underpricing of an IPO.  Assuming that the issuer does not independently perform 
its own pre-IPO valuation—a safe assumption, as this would defeat in large part the 
very purpose of retaining an underwriter—the issuer will not know that its IPO has 
been undervalued until after the offering, when the shares begin trading at levels in 
excess of the offer price.  By then, the damage is done, and the issuer may have little, 
if any, recourse.  But there is considerable evidence that issuers are not troubled by 
IPO underpricing, if indeed they are even conscious of its existence.  For one, a 
massive increase in price on the first day of trading may attract valuable media and 
research analyst coverage.  See infra note 356 and accompanying text.  It may also 
cement the issuer’s relationship with the underwriter, a consideration particularly 
important where the issuer expects to draw upon the underwriter’s services in the 
future.  And underwriters may mollify the issuer’s key management by selling them 
options in the IPO or in future hot IPOs.  See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying 
text. 
 44 Alexander, supra note 31, at 68. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See id. at 68-69 (discussing the underwriter’s financial and reputational 
incentives to underprice); see also infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text 
(discussing the effect of forgone capitalization). 
 47 See SEC Approves Amendments to Free-Riding and Withholding 
Interpretation, NASD Notice to Members 98-48 (Aug. 17, 1998) (“Hot issue securities 
are defined by the Interpretation as securities of a public offering that trade at a 
premium in the secondary market whenever such trading commences.”). 
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them in the highly competitive aftermarket48—for a substantial 
profit.49 
One might suppose that the underwriter could simply retain the 
hot IPO shares until trading commences and then flip them in the 
aftermarket for a profit.  This practice is known as “withholding,” and 
as one might expect, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(“NASD”) has promulgated regulations that prohibit it.50  The Free-
Riding and Withholding Rules require the underwriter “to make a 
bona fide public distribution at the public offering price of securities 
of a public offering which trade at a premium in the secondary 
market.”51  Traditionally, this rule has meant that an underwriter has 
discretion to place IPO shares with investors of its choosing, so long 
as they are not employees, officers, directors, partners, or agents of 
the underwriter.52  Thus, by requiring the underwriter to sell its IPO 
shares to investors at the offering price—the same price the 
underwriter paid the issuer minus the discount—the Free-Riding and 
Withholding Rules limit the underwriter’s direct profit to the 
discount paid by the issuer.53 
 
 48 The aftermarket, i.e., the secondary market, is “the securities market in which 
previously issued securities are traded among investors.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
984 (7th ed. 1999). 
 49 Meredith B. Cross & Christine Sarudy Roberts, Recent Developments in 
Underwriting of IPOs: “Spinning” and Syndicate Penalty Bids, 1084 PLI/CORP. 595, 597 
(1998). 
 50 See NASD Manual, IM-2110-1(b)(1) (1998), available at 
http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/9848ntm.txt (last visited Feb. 26, 2004); see also 
Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on Flipping IPO Securities, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 883, 894 & n.65 (2000) (defining withholding); Susan Pulliam & 
Randall Smith, Two at CSFB Put on Leave Amid IPO Probe, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at 
C1 (stating that the NASD rule forbids underwriters from retaining an equity interest 
in the issuer).  NASD Rule 2110 further states: 
The failure to make a bona fide public distribution when there is a 
demand for an issue can be a factor in artificially raising the price.  
Thus, the failure to do so, especially when the member may have 
information relating to the demand for the securities or other factors 
not generally known to the public, is inconsistent with high standards 
of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade and 
leads to an impairment of public confidence in the fairness of the 
investment banking and securities business. 
NASD Manual, supra, at IM-2110-1(a)(1). 
 51 NASD Manual, supra note 50, at IM-2110-1(a)(1); see supra note 20 and 
accompanying text. 
 52 NASD Manual, supra note 50, at IM-2110-1(b)(2); see Maynard, supra note 22, 
at 2039. 
 53 See 3A BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 19, § 8:2 (“[M]embers of the 
underwriting group are compensated by the per-share difference between the 
offering price and the price to be paid by the underwriter to the issuer . . . .”); 
Crocker, supra note 15, at 392 (“The underwriters purchase the shares from the 
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Nevertheless, there is at least one significant method by which 
an underwriter may benefit beyond just the discount.  Because 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and NASD regulations 
allow the underwriter broad discretion to allocate IPO shares to non-
affiliated investors of its choosing, the underwriter has the ability to 
confer substantial financial benefits upon specific investors through 
the allocation of hot issues.54  These select investors, in turn, are free 
to flip the IPO shares in the aftermarket for a quick, virtually 
guaranteed profit, courtesy of the underwriter.55  Obviously, such 
allocation practices tend to generate a tremendous amount of 
investor goodwill toward underwriters in times of hot IPO markets, 
and underwriters have exercised their discretion strategically.56 
As a group, institutional investors represent the single largest 
constituency in U.S. equities markets.57  Perhaps not coincidentally, 
they have also received the lion’s share of hot IPO allocations.58  
Nevertheless, beginning in the 1980s and increasing through the 
 
company at an agreed upon discount to the offering price called the ‘gross spread,’ 
which serves as their compensation.”). 
 54 See Fishe, supra note 29, at 319 (“When the ‘order book’ is built for an IPO, the 
underwriter tries to determine who will flip, who will hold shares, and the total 
demand with and without flippers.”); see also Mills, supra note 36, at H1 (describing 
the strategy underwriters employ in building an order book of IPO subscribers). 
 55 Mills, supra note 36, at H1 (“[Y]ou want some flippers—investors who quickly 
sell their shares—otherwise, on the first day of trading nothing would happen.”).  Of 
course, the investor need not flip the shares immediately to enjoy the benefit of 
receiving an underpriced security.  As some of the more spectacular IPOs of the late 
1990s have demonstrated, however, holding hot IPO shares over long periods of time 
may introduce long-term risk, and may even cause the investor to sustain a loss.  See 
infra notes 357-58 and accompanying text. 
 56 Mills, supra note 36, at HI; see Coffee, supra note 30, at 5 (“Clearly, IPO 
allotments are not distributed under any equal opportunity or ‘first-come-first served’ 
rule, but instead go to favored customers.  This should not surprise, as most 
merchants in times of scarce supply will favor long-standing or major customers over 
the first-time customer.”). 
 57 Eric W. Orts, 1998 Survey of Books Relating to the Law, The Future of Enterprise 
Organization, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1947, 1963 (1998) (noting that institutional investors 
collectively own most publicly traded stock in United States markets); see Thomas A. 
Stewart, The King Is Dead. (Stockholders Are Gaining Power over Chief Executives), 
FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 34 (“[I]nstitutional investors—pension funds, mutual 
funds, insurance companies— . . . hold 50.3% of all the stock of all the corporations 
in America.”). 
 58 Michael Siconolfi, The Spin Desk: Underwriters Set Aside IPO Stock for Officials of 
Potential Customers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1997, at A1 (“It is no news that underwriters 
make most of the shares in hot IPOs available not to the little-guy investor but to 
institutions, such as mutual-fund companies and pension funds, that provide a lot of 
trading commissions and other business.”); see Terzah Ewing & Joshua Harris Prager, 
Many Are Finding IPOs Still Out of Reach, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C21 (“Small 
investors receive less than a quarter of the shares in the average IPO . . . .”). 
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rampant bull market of the 1990s,59 some influential individual 
investors began to demand a larger piece of the IPO pie.60  
Consequently, many underwriters began to seek a method by which 
they could continue to entice high-volume customers while 
simultaneously satiating individual investors’ demand for shares of 
hot IPOs.61  As it turned out, “spinning” became the strategy of 
choice.62 
Spinning, in Wall Street parlance, refers to the underwriter’s 
practice of allocating hot IPO shares to the personal trading accounts 
of individual investors who, in their capacity as directors or senior 
officers of a corporation, are in a position to direct future corporate 
business to the underwriter.63  Before the start of open trading, the 
underwriter sells IPO shares into the investor’s trading account at the 
offer price.64  If the IPO stock is trading substantially higher by the 
end of the first trading day (i.e., the IPO is “hot”), the investor, or 
perhaps the underwriter,65 may then flip the stock (i.e., sell it in the 
aftermarket), and the investor will realize a substantial profit.  The 
underwriter’s purpose in performing this service is to foster goodwill 
among corporate decision-makers who might later direct corporate 
business back to the underwriter.66  Critics argue that spinning, in its 
essence, is a quid pro quo.67 
How pervasive is spinning?  In 1997, the Wall Street Journal first 
 
 59 See, e.g., George R. Monahan & Grace Toto, Monthly Statistical Review, SEC. 
INDUSTRY ASS’N RES. REP., Feb. 16, 2000, at 9 (noting that eight of the securities 
industry’s ten best profit years occurred in the 1990s), available at 
http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/marginVol1-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). 
 60 Maynard, supra note 22, at 2029-30; see Siconolfi, supra note 58, at A1 (noting 
that spinning began in the 1980s). 
 61 See generally Ewing & Prager, supra note 58 (describing efforts to bring 
individual investors into the IPO market). 
 62 Siconolfi, supra note 58, at A1 (describing the practice of spinning as 
“rampant”). 
 63 Maynard, supra note 22, at 2027; Cross & Roberts, supra note 49, at 597; 
Siconolfi, supra note 58, at A1. 
 64 Siconolfi, supra note 58, at A1. 
 65 As a service to clients, some underwriters will allocate hot IPO shares to a 
client’s discretionary trading account and later flip the shares for a profit, thus 
eliminating the need for client participation.  Id.  A discretionary account is “[a]n 
account that allows a broker access to a customer’s funds to purchase and sell 
securities or commodities for the customer based on the broker’s judgment and 
without first having to obtain the customer’s consent to the purchase or sale.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (7th ed. 1999). 
 66 Siconolfi, supra note 58, at A1 (quoting Hambrecht & Quist’s managing 
director of investment banking as candidly admitting to “trying to solicit business” 
through the practice). 
 67 See, e.g., Maynard, supra note 22, at 2027-28. 
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reported on the practice, quoting an executive officer of a technology 
company as saying, “It’s as common as water.”68  The article 
recounted how Joseph Cayre, the CEO of GT Interactive Software 
Corp., had realized a $2 million one-day profit on hot IPO shares in 
Pixar Animation Studios that he had purchased from his broker, 
Robertson Stephens.69  Several weeks later, GT Interactive selected 
Robertson Stephens to underwrite its own IPO, a transaction that 
ultimately generated over $5 million in fees for the broker.70  In 
response to this story, the SEC opened an investigation into spinning 
practices on Wall Street, but closed the investigation in 2001 without 
taking any formal action.71 
Meanwhile, amidst the fallout of recent corporate scandals,72 new 
tales of even more dramatic proportions have emerged.  In July 2002, 
in court papers filed in connection with his wrongful termination 
suit, a former Salomon Smith Barney (“SSB”) broker alleged 
widescale spinning at the Citigroup unit.73  The allegation prompted 
the House Financial Services Committee to subpoena SSB records as 
part of a legislative inquiry into fraud in the financial services 
industry.74  Documents that SSB subsequently turned over to the 
Committee suggest that throughout the late 1990s, SSB favored a 
select group of individual investors with large and repeated 
allocations of hot IPO shares.75  WorldCom is illustrative of what many 
commentators regard as the abuses inherent in IPO spinning: 
 
 68 Siconolfi, supra note 58, at A1. 
 69 Id.  Pixar’s IPO stock closed up seventy-seven percent on its first trading day; 
Mr. Cayre held 100,000 shares at the time.  Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Susanne Craig & Charles Gasparino, Salomon Used IPOs as Lure, Broker Says, 
WALL ST. J., July 18, 2002, at C1. 
 72 An excellent article that captures the flavor and magnitude of corporate 
scandals of late is Mark Gimein, You Bought.  They Sold., FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 64.  
The author documents an economy-wide trend of executive cashing-in since 1999 
amounting to $66 billion dollars in executive profits.  Id. at 66.  At the same time 
these executives were profiting by selling off stock holdings at the peak of the 
market, their corporations were shedding at least seventy-five percent of their market 
capitalization.  Id. at 65 (limiting the study to executive selling at corporations with a 
peak market capitalization of $400 million and a subsequent decline in value of at 
least seventy-five percent). 
 73 See Dan Ackman, A Harmonic Convergence of Sleaze, Forbes.com (July 18, 2002), 
at http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/18/0718topnews_print.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2004).  David Chacon’s amended pleading alleged that he was fired for 
complaining about SSB’s spinning practices with respect to a number of 
telecommunications executives.  Id. 
 74 See Craig & Gasparino, supra note 71, at C1. 
 75 The House Financial Services Committee has made these documents available 
to the public at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/citiresp2_001.pdf. 
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WorldCom directors Walter Scott, Jr., Stiles Kellett, Jr., and James Q. 
Crowe personally realized $2.4 million, $202,047, and $3.5 million, 
respectively, on allocations of hot IPO shares from SSB;76 CEO 
Bernard Ebbers earned more than $11 million.77  WorldCom repaid 
this largess in kind, awarding SSB more than $107 million in 
corporate business between 1998 and 2002,78 just before filing the 
largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy in United States history in July 2002.79 
Such practices, however, extend far beyond SSB and WorldCom.  
Recent Wall Street Journal articles have chronicled spinning by Credit 
Suisse First Boston80 and Goldman Sachs,81 as well.  Directors and 
officers of Qwest Communications,82 McLeodUSA,83 and Metromedia 
Fiber Networks,84 may also be among the many executives who 
profited from spun shares in oversubscribed85 IPOs in the late 1990s.  
While their officers were profiting from hot IPO shares, each of these 
corporations supplied the underwriter, SSB, with millions of dollars 
of investment banking business.86  Perhaps even more disturbing are 
reports that underwriters may have spun IPO shares to prominent 
members of Congress.87 
 
 76 See Susanne Craig, Offerings Were Easy Money for Ebbers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2002, 
at C1. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, 
State Suit Seeks Repayment of IPO and Stock Option Profits of Corporate Executives 
(Sept. 30, 2002) [hereinafter State Suit Seeks Repayment], available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/sep/sep30c_02.html (last visited Feb. 26, 
2004). 
 79 Shawn Young et al., Leading the News: WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., 
July 22, 2002, at A3. 
 80 Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, Buddy System: How a Technology-Banking Star 
Doled Out Shares of Hot IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at A1. 
 81 See Michael Erman & Per Jebsen, Top Executives Risk Lawsuits over Goldman IPO 
List, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2002 (on file with author). 
 82 See Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, 
Investment Banking Deals and Corporate Executive Profits (Sept. 30, 2002) 
[hereinafter Chart] (attributing $4.8 million in IPO profits to Chairman Philip 
Anschutz and $1 million in profits to CEO Joseph Nacchio), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/sep/sep30c_02_chart.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2004). 
 83 Id. (attributing $9.4 million in IPO profits to CEO Clark McLeod). 
 84 Id. (attributing $1.5 million in IPO profits to Chairman Stephen Garofalo). 
 85 See Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1383 n.13 (“An issue [i.e., an IPO] is 
oversubscribed when more orders are placed for the issue than can be satisfied by 
the issuer.”). 
 86 See Chart, supra note 82 (citing $37 million in fees from Qwest, $49 million in 
fees from McLeodUSA, and $47 million in fees from Metromedia). 
 87 See Christine B. Whelan & Tom Hamburger, IPO Largess Flowed to Capitol Hill, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at A4.  This Comment, however, will focus only on 
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PART II: THE CASE AGAINST SPINNING 
Most Wall Street observers first became acquainted with the 
practice of spinning as a result of the November 1997 Wall Street 
Journal exposé.88  But in the exuberant bull market of the late 1990s, 
public outcry was short-lived, and the issue of spinning did not again 
attract broad public scrutiny until the summer of 2002.89  Now, in the 
fallout of recent scandals, reform is underway.90 
Probably the most frequently voiced criticism of spinning is that 
it is nothing more than a thinly veiled form of corporate bribery.91  
But the term “bribe” often connotes images of brown paper bags 
filled with cash changing hands behind closed doors.92  In a spinning 
transaction, by contrast, the flow of cash is necessarily much less 
obvious.93  Defenders of the practice often argue that IPO shares are 
an investment like any other, and are simply not the equivalent of a 
cash gift.94  They note that inherent in any publicly traded security is 
risk, and this risk—this chance for loss—is what sets IPO allocations 
apart from bribery.95  Surely directors and officers are allowed to 
participate in equity markets like any other retail investor? 
But a CEO is not like any other retail investor, as is obvious to 
anyone who sought in vain to purchase into a hot IPO in the 1990s.96  
 
spinning in the corporate context. 
 88 See Siconolfi, supra note 58. 
 89 See, for example, Craig & Gasparino, supra note 71, as the first in a series of 
spinning stories that the Wall Street Journal ran in the wake of spinning allegations at 
SSB. 
 90 See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. 
 91 See, e.g., Maynard, supra note 22, at 2036; see also Pascutto, supra note 11 (stating 
that spinning is a form of bribery and noting that in Hong Kong markets, spinning is 
an arrestable offence under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance); Michael 
Siconolfi, SEC Broadens ‘Spinning’ Probe to Corporations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1997, at 
C1 (quoting former SEC commissioner Steven Wallman as saying, “It’s a black-and-
white corporate bribery issue”); Michael Siconolfi, ‘Spinning’ of Hot IPOs Is Probed, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1998, at C1 (quoting former SEC commissioner Edward 
Fleischman as saying spinning “sure smells like whatever commercial bribery is”); 
Siconolfi, supra note 58 (quoting Robert Messih, managing director at Salomon Inc., 
as affirmatively stating, “It’s a bribe, no question about it”). 
 92 See, e.g., Pascutto, supra note 11. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See George Bragues, Why Single Out CEOs?, NAT’L POST, Jan. 2, 2003, at 8. 
 95 See id. (“While it’s common for shares to trade at a premium to the offer price 
on the first day, it’s not guaranteed.”); see also Mark D. Seltzer, ‘Spinning’ Hot Stocks: Is 
It a Crime?, BUS. CRIMES BULL.: COMPLIANCE & LITIG., Sept. 1998, at 7 (“The best 
defense against charges of fiduciary fraud or bribery in the spinning context may be 
that IPO shares remain market instruments that involve a substantial risk of loss.”). 
 96 See Pascutto, supra note 11 (“If a retail investor called the investment bank to 
purchase some of the IPO, the chances of getting any shares are slim to none.”). 
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Corporate decision-makers have a powerful advantage during the 
IPO allocation process that enables them to take a share of the 
offering while other individual investors are shut out.97  Further, 
consider that in 1999 and 2000, at the peak of the IPO market, the 
average IPO closed up sixty-five percent on its first day of public 
trading.98  Under such market conditions, recipients of IPO share 
allocations were virtually assured of a substantial and instantaneous 
profit with little or no risk.99  If there were any question whether the 
IPO shares would trade up on their first day of public trading, some 
unscrupulous underwriters deftly eliminated this uncertainty by 
allocating the shares to the director’s or officer’s discretionary 
trading account only after trading had commenced and the price had 
begun to rise.100  Hence, at the moment of allocation, the recipient 
was already “in the money.” 
Bribery implies a quid pro quo,101 however, and it is here that 
prosecutors and potential litigants have faced the greatest difficulty in 
making their case for corporate bribery.102  Parties to a spinning 
transaction typically will deny the existence of a quid pro quo.103  
Thus, critics of spinning have long argued that when an underwriter 
spins shares of a hot IPO to a corporate officer or director, the quid 
pro quo is implied.104  The underwriter allocates hot IPO shares (the 
“quid,” as it were) to a corporate director or officer in return for a 
“quo” of corporate investment banking business at some future time.  
But the problem with this approach is that it suffers from the fallacy 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Mike McNamee, Getting the Price Right, BUS. WK., Sept. 9, 2002, at 126. 
 99 See Siconolfi, supra note 58. 
 100 See Seltzer, supra note 95.  This practice, known as “withholding,” is a technical 
violation of the NASD Free-Riding and Withholding Rule.  See supra note 50 and 
accompanying text. 
 101 See Coffee, supra note 30, at 5 (“[A] bribe typically requires a specific quid pro 
quo exchange.”); Seltzer, supra note 95 (examining New York and Massachusetts 
commercial bribery statutes, as well as bribery under the Federal Travel Act). 
 102 See Seltzer, supra note 95 (“The government would confront substantial 
obstacles . . . in proving the required quid pro quo . . . .”). 
 103 See, e.g., Siconolfi, supra note 58 (recounting how Joseph Cayre and 
underwriter Robertson Stephens denied the existence of a quid pro quo on an 
allocation of Pixar IPO shares).  But see Mills, supra note 36, at H1 (candidly 
admitting that institutional investors who tell the underwriter during the roadshow 
that they intend to flip the shares “are given shares as a kind of favor, to get them to 
continue doing more business with Merrill [Lynch]”). 
 104 See John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Spinning’ for Dollars: IPOs and Allocation of Hot Issues, N.Y. 
L.J., Mar. 26, 1998, at 5 (observing that the underwriter will generally know when an 
offering is oversubscribed, and arguing that spinning in such instances amounts to a 
“tacit commercial bribe”). 
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of post hoc, ergo propter hoc;105 the mere fact that an investment banking 
contract follows a spinning transaction does not necessarily imply a 
causal relation.106  Further difficulties arise when a corporate director 
or officer receives IPO stock placements from multiple 
underwriters—a common occurrence—but only supplies corporate 
business to one underwriter in return.107 
Even if spinning does not rise to the level of corporate bribery, it 
does create corporate conflicts of interest, as the NASD itself has 
conceded.108  In August 2002, the association issued a Notice to 
Members in which it wrote: 
“Spinning” or awarding IPO shares to the executive officers and 
directors of the company divides the loyalty of the agents of the 
company (i.e., the executive officers and directors) from the 
principal (i.e., the company) on whose behalf they must act.  This 
practice is inconsistent with just and equitable principles of 
trade.109 
Indeed, several commentators have expanded on this idea by arguing 
that spinning is a violation of the corporate opportunity doctrine.110 
Spinning creates an added incentive for underwriters to 
underprice IPOs.111  Pricing IPO shares below market demand creates 
securities that have an inflated value that the underwriter may then 
exploit to its own advantage when making the distribution.112  For 
example, the underwriter may use these hot IPO shares as a kind of 
currency to buy favors from individual investors who are also 
 
 105 This phrase refers to the false assumption that simply because B happened 
after A, B happened as a result of A. 
 106 See Seltzer, supra note 95 (noting that “[t]he mere coincidence of timing 
between IPO allocation and prospective underwriting work may not be sufficient” to 
satisfy state commercial bribery statutes). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Regulation of IPO Allocations and Distributions, NASD Notice to Members 02-
55 (Aug. 2002). 
 109 Id. at 525.  NASD rules explicitly require members to adhere to “high 
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.”  NASD 
Manual, supra note 50, at IM-2110-1(a)(1). 
 110 See William H. Donaldson, Testimony Concerning Global Research Analyst Settlement, 
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (May 7, 
2003) [hereinafter Donaldson, Testimony] (noting that spinning “raises serious 
questions about whether the corporate insiders who take hot IPO shares in exchange 
for their firms’ investment banking business are breaching their fiduciary duties to 
their shareholders”), at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts050703whd.htm (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2004); see also Maynard, supra note 22, at 2085.  For a discussion of the 
corporate opportunity doctrine, see infra Part IV.B.1. 
 111 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 112 See McNamee, supra note 98, at 126 (“[Underpricing] turned IPO shares into a 
currency that some underwriters abused.”). 
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corporate decision makers.113  This, in turn, creates negative effects 
on several levels.  Most immediately, misjudging market demand 
deprives the issuer of capitalization that it could have realized in the 
offering.114  Consider that in 1999 and 2000, IPO underpricing caused 
the average IPO issuer to miss out on $79 million in capitalization 
from the offering.115  This money, which should have gone to the 
issuing corporation to fund research, pay salaries, and distribute 
dividends, instead went largely to a few fortunate investors, including 
corporate directors and officers, whose influence bought them a 
share of the distribution.116  One might expect the management of an 
issuer to demand better service from the underwriter, but often, 
underwriters were able to mollify management by granting them 
options in the IPO or spinning future hot IPO shares to their 
personal accounts.117  Thus, IPO underpricing may generate further 
conflicts of interest by swaying directors and officers to act (or fail to 
act) in subversion of their primary duty to the corporation and its 
shareholders.118 
Another consideration falls under the general rubric of 
“fairness.”  Many critics decry as unfair the inability of most small 
investors to participate in any IPO allocations119 while select individual 
 
 113 This is the essence of spinning.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 114 See McNamee, supra note 98. 
 115 Id. (providing data showing that in 1999 and 2000, the average IPO priced at 
$5 or more traded up sixty-five percent on its first day of trading, causing the average 
issuer to lose out on $79 million in capitalization (measured in year 2000 dollars)).  
Thompson Financial data show 510 IPOs in 1999 and 385 IPOs in 2000.  See Elstein, 
supra note 7.  The foregoing figures thus suggest an aggregate of approximately $70 
billion in forgone capitalization in just those two years.  See id.; McNamee, supra note 
98. 
 116 McNamee, supra note 98. 
 117 See Coffee, supra note 104 (offering an excellent description of how an 
executive of the issuer can profit even when the issuer itself fails to realize capital due 
to IPO underpricing). 
 118 Id. (discussing fiduciary duty issues inherent in spinning). 
 119 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 30 (noting that media coverage has tended to 
characterize small investors who are shut out of the IPO process as victims); Susanne 
Craig, IPO Allotments: A Guide to the Game, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at C1 
(attributing the current interest in spinning to the fact that “it doesn’t seem fair that 
some wealthy investors got favored treatment”); Craig, supra note 76 (quoting 
Congressman Michael Oxley as saying that Bernard Ebbers’s spinning profits “raise[] 
questions about the fairness of the process that brings new listings to the markets”); 
Press Release, United States House of Representatives, Congressmen Kanjorski and 
Shays Release Salomon Smith Barney’s Initial Response on IPO Allocations to 
WorldCom Executives (July 12, 2002) (“As we examine the lessons of the Internet 
bubble, I hope that all investment banks will reevaluate their policies to improve 
fairness in the allocation of IPO shares in the future.”), at 
http://www.house.gov/kanjorski/02_07_12WorldComKanjorskiShaysCitigroup.htm 
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investors participate in dozens of offerings.120  Others have argued 
that many investment banks owe much of their business capital to 
mutual funds and pension plans, comprised of contributions from 
countless individual small investors.121  Hence, the argument goes, 
fairness dictates that when a bank underwrites an IPO, it should 
allocate the shares to the funds and not to the executives of 
influential clients.122 
Recently, New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
suggested a new basis for concern: the synergies that arise between 
hot IPO spinning and phony analyst stock ratings.123  In September 
2002, Spitzer brought suit against five corporate executives under 
New York’s Martin Act,124 seeking to disgorge their profits from 
trading in hot IPO allocations.125  The complaint alleged a tri-fold 
scheme whereby the underwriter, in this case SSB, spun hot IPO 
shares to the personal accounts of defendant executives in return for 
corporate investment banking business from their respective 
corporations.126  Once SSB secured this investment banking business, 
Spitzer alleged, SSB would then hand the reins to its chief 
telecommunications analyst Jack Grubman, who would follow 
through by providing unduly optimistic and often false stock 
ratings.127  In this manner, SSB secured lucrative investment banking 
 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2004). 
 120 See Donaldson, Testimony, supra note 110 (stating that “[s]pinning increases the 
public perception that IPO allocations are an insiders’ game”); see also State Suit 
Seeks Repayment, supra note 78 (stating that Qwest executives participated in fifty-
seven IPO offerings between September 1998 and February 2002). 
 121 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing the dominant role that 
institutional investors play in modern equities markets). 
 122 See Letters to the Editor, The ‘Little Guy’ Gets Stiffed Again, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 
1997, at A23 [hereinafter Letters to the Editor].  But note that institutional investors 
remain the largest participant in IPO allocations.  See supra note 58 and 
accompanying text. 
 123 See State Suit Seeks Repayment, supra note 78.  The press release noted that the 
suit “grew out of a broad conflict of interest investigation into Wall Street brokerage 
firms.”  Id. 
 124 Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW  §§ 352, 352(c), 353, 353-a, 359(g) (McKinney 
2002).  The Martin Act is New York’s 1921 state securities law, and commentators 
widely regard it as the toughest in the nation.  See Jerry Markon & Charles Gasparino, 
For Corporate-Crime Fighters, 1921 Martin Act Isn’t Too Old, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Oct. 2, 
2002), at http://www.litigation-results.com/popupwallst10_2.htm (last visited Feb. 
26, 2004).  It grants the state Attorney General broad powers to prosecute the 
fraudulent sale of securities and does not require proof of a quid pro quo.  Id. 
 125 See Complaint, State v. Anschutz, available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/sep/sep30c_02_complaint.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2004). 
 126 Id. ¶ 1. 
 127 Id.  For instance, Grubman still had a buy rating on Metromedia Fiber 
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business,128 and the defendant executives profited twice: first, on the 
sale of spun IPO shares,129 and again on the sale of the artificially 
inflated stock that they held in their corporations.130  The cost of 
these schemes, Spitzer concluded, fell squarely on those investors 
who relied on Grubman’s phony stock ratings and who held stock 
while these schemes fell apart.131  Spitzer summed up the relationship 
between spinning and analyst conflicts of interest thus: 
The spinning of hot IPO shares was not a harmless corporate 
perk.  Instead, it was an integral part of a fraudulent scheme to 
win new investment banking business.  And, once again, we see 
enormous pressure being placed upon research analysts to issue 
misleading stock ratings in order to secure that business.132 
As Attorney General Spitzer recognized, spinning often occurs in 
conjunction with, and reinforces, other conflicts of interest involving 
research analysts and investment bankers.133 
 
Networks, even after its stock fell from $40 in June 2000 to just $4 in June 2001.  Id. ¶ 
55.  Similarly, WorldCom still had a buy rating after it fell from $46 in June 2000 to 
$7 in March 2002.  Id. ¶ 71.  At around the same time, Grubman allegedly wrote an e-
mail to a colleague in which he stated, “most of our banking clients are going to zero 
and you know I wanted to downgrade them months ago but got a huge pushback 
from banking [i.e., SSB’s investment banking division].”  Id. ¶ 54. 
 128 Spitzer’s research indicates that between 1996 and 2002, these fees totaled $37 
million from Qwest Communications, $47 million from Metromedia Fiber Networks, 
$49 million from McLeodUSA, and $107 million from WorldCom.  Chart, supra note 
82. 
 129 These profits totaled over $28 million for the five named defendants.  See supra 
notes 82-84. 
 130 Just prior to the crash in stock price of their respective companies, four of the 
five named defendants sold off their stock holdings.  Clark McLeod (McLeodUSA) 
made $16 million on his sale of McLeodUSA stock; Bernard Ebbers (WorldCom) 
made $23 million on his sale of WorldCom stock; Joseph Naccio (Qwest) made $226 
million on his sale of Qwest stock; and Philip Anschutz (Qwest) made an astonishing 
$1.4 billion on his sale of Qwest stock.  See Chart, supra note 82. 
 131 See State Suit Seeks Repayment, supra note 78 (“Uninformed shareholders, 
meanwhile, lost millions of dollars when the stocks in the defendants’ companies 
crashed.”). 
 132 Id.  Recently, the NASD brought similar suits against Frank Quattrone, who 
oversaw CSFB’s underwriting business in the late 1990s.  The suits accused Mr. 
Quattrone of nourishing analyst conflicts of interest through the use of spinning.  See 
Charles Gasparino & Randall Smith, Quattrone Faces Civil Charges on ‘Spinning’, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 7, 2003, at C1.  These suits represent the first time the NASD has charged 
an investment banker with spinning.  Id.  Mr. Quattrone’s first trial ended in a hung 
jury in October 2003; as of February 2004, a retrial was pending.  Executives on Trial: 
Quattrone Retrial Is Postponed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2004, at C5. 
 133 New York’s Martin Act action has already proved effective in inducing several 
of the defendants to relinquish some, though not all, of their spinning profits.  
Phillip Anschutz disgorged $4.4 million in spinning profits.  Press Release, Office of 
the New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Telecom Executive Agrees to Give Up 
IPO Profits (May 13, 2003) (noting that this is “the first time an executive has given 
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PART III: THE GLOBAL RESOLUTION AND ITS LIKELY EFFECTS 
Within three months after filing the Martin Act complaint, Eliot 
Spitzer announced that the New York Office of the Attorney General, 
the SEC and other regulatory authorities had reached a global 
resolution with ten major brokerage houses to settle the 
government’s broader conflicts of interest probe.134  According to the 
initial press release, one of the central provisions of the agreement is 
“a complete ban on the spinning of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).  
Brokerage firms will not allocate lucrative IPO shares to corporate 
executives and directors who are in the position to greatly influence 
investment banking decisions.”135  The ten participating firms also 
agreed to pay a total of $1.435 billion, to consist of approximately 
$900 million in fines and disgorgment, $450 million for independent 
research over five years, and $85 million spent on investor 
education.136 
On October 31, 2003, Judge William H. Pauley III of the 
Southern District of New York approved the global resolution, at 
which time the SEC released the language of the final judgments to 
the public.137  Despite anticipatory fanfare of a “complete ban” on 
spinning, the final judgments of eight of the ten corporate 
defendants make no mention whatsoever of IPOs.138  Indeed, 
 
up profits linked to the controversial Wall Street practice known as ‘IPO spinning’”), 
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/may/may13b_03.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2004).  Joseph P. Nacchio agreed to disgorge $400,000 of his spinning profits.  
Press Release, Office of the New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Telecom 
Executive Agrees to Give Up IPO Profits (Oct. 9, 2003), at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/oct/oct09a_03.html (last visited Feb. 26, 
2004).  Stephen Garofalo, former CEO of Metromedia Fiber Network, has agreed to 
disgorge $1.5 million of his spinning profits.  Press Release, Office of the New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Former Telecom Executive Agrees to Turn Over IPO 
Profits (Dec. 4, 2003), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/ 
dec/dec04b_03.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).  As of December 2003, no 
settlements had yet been reached in the suits against Bernard Ebbers or Clark 
McLeod.  Id. 
 134 Global Resolution Press Release, supra note 1. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See Randall Smith, Will Investors Benefit from Wall Street’s Split?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
23, 2002, at C1.  But see Gregory Zuckerman, The Stock-Research Pact: Wall Street’s 
Settlement Will Be Less Taxing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2003, at C1 (suggesting that the 
fines portion will only amount to $450 million, with the balance consisting of tax-
deductible restitution, education, and independent research payments).  The SEC 
reports the following breakdown under the terms of the final judgments: $497 
million in penalties; $397 million in disgorgment; $432.5 million to fund 
independent research; and $80 million for investor education.  See Federal Court 
Approves Global Research Analyst Settlement, supra note 3. 
 137 See Federal Court Approves Global Research Analyst Settlement, supra note 3. 
 138 There is no mention of initial public offerings in the final judgments or 
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examination of SEC press releases exposes the reason for this 
apparent omission: “the firms have collectively entered into a 
voluntary agreement restricting allocations of securities in ‘hot’ 
IPOs.”139  Thus, only the two corporate defendants who were 
specifically charged with spinning—SSB and Credit Suisse First 
Boston (“CSFB”)—received judgments placing restrictions on their 
future allocation of IPO shares.140  But assuming all the defendants’ 
good faith in adhering to the voluntary ban, SSB’s final judgment, 
which does address IPOs, is emblematic of the type of restrictions 
that the defendants will face.141  It contains two provisions specifically 
related to spinning.  First, the judgment states that SSB142 shall be 
permanently restrained and enjoined from violating Rule 2110 of 
the Conduct Rules of NASD, Inc. . . . and Rules 401 and 476 of 
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. [“NYSE”] . . . by . . . giving 
preferential allocations of shares in initial public offerings to 
directors, officers, or executives of existing or potential 
investment banking clients.143 
This provision is the crux of the global resolution’s putative 
prohibition on spinning, striking at the very conduct that amounts to 
a spinning transaction.  The second provision is essentially a 
monitoring guideline; it provides that SSB shall be 
permanently restrained and enjoined from violating NASD Rule 
3010 and NYSE Rule 342 by failing to maintain appropriate 
supervisory procedures regarding or controls over the following 
 
addenda of the following eight corporate defendants: Bear Stearns; J.P. Morgan 
Securities; Lehman Brothers; Merrill Lynch; U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray; U.B.S. 
Warburg; Goldman Sachs; and Morgan Stanley.  Links to each of the final judgments 
are available at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18438.htm. 
 139 Donaldson, Testimony, supra note 110 (emphasis added). 
 140 Close examination of SEC statements exposes the reason for this apparent 
omission: the putative ban on spinning is “voluntary.” Donaldson, Testimony, supra 
note 110 (noting that “the firms have collectively entered into a voluntary agreement 
restricting allocations of securities in ‘hot’ IPOs”). 
 141 CSFB’s final judgment contains wording identical to that of SSB with respect to 
IPOs.  See Final Judgment as to Defendant Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, f/k/a 
Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation at 2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003), available at 
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judg18110.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004); Final 
Judgment as to Defendant Citigroup Global Markets Inc., f/k/a Salomon Smith 
Barney Inc. at 3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter SSB Final Judgment], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judge18111.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2004).  Thus, this Comment’s treatment of the SSB settlement applies 
equally to that of CSFB. 
 142 Or rather, “[SSB], [SSB’s] officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and 
all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of 
this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.”  SSB Final Judgment, supra 
note 141, at 3. 
 143 Id. 
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that are reasonably designed to ensure compliance with securities 
laws and regulations: . . . its [SSB’s] business activities relating to 
allocations of shares of initial public offerings.144 
Although initial reaction to some of the global resolution’s broader 
structural reforms has been mixed, a number of commentators have 
openly applauded its putative ban on spinning.145 
Use of the “putative” qualifier is necessary because the question 
remains: Does the global resolution truly ban spinning?  The answer, 
it seems, is not as clear as many commentators have supposed.  
Unremarkably, the SSB final judgment enjoins SSB from violating 
NASD Rule 2110 and NYSE Rules 401 and 476.  Yet, none of these 
rules is new; all were in place at the time SSB was engaged in 
spinning; and violations of these rules have always been actionable.146  
Thus, it seems that the global resolution has added absolutely 
nothing by enjoining SSB from violating these rules.  What is 
remarkable about the SSB final judgment’s language, however, is its 
assertion that “giving preferential allocations of shares in initial 
public offerings to directors, officers, or executives of existing or 
potential investment banking clients”147 amounts to a violation of 
these rules.  These rules have not in the past been interpreted to 
preclude spinning;148 indeed, when the SEC launched its initial 
investigation into spinning practices in the late 1990s, it closed its 
investigation without finding that any of these rules had been 
violated.149 
It is also unclear what the New York Attorney General and the 
SEC meant by prohibiting “preferential allocations of shares in initial 
public offerings”150 to corporate fiduciaries.  Indeed, their deliberate 
use of the adjective “preferential” strongly suggests that they did not 
intend to preclude all allocations of IPO stock to corporate 
fiduciaries—only preferential allocations.  But what exactly is a 
“preferential allocation”?  Common sense and a plain reading of the 
 
 144 Id. at 4. 
 145 See, e.g., Editorial, The Spitzer-Weill Stock Trade, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002 
(characterizing the overall agreement as largely ineffectual, but applauding the ban 
on spinning). 
 146 For a list of all amendments to the NYSE rules since 1997, see the NYSE web 
page at 
www.nyse.com/regulation/p1020656068597.html?displayPage=%2F1022221392606.h
tml. 
 147 SSB Final Judgment, supra note 141, at 3. 
 148 See Craig, supra note 119 (noting that neither the SEC nor the NASD had ever 
brought charges against a party for spinning). 
 149 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
 150 SSB Final Judgment, supra note 141, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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text would suggest that it is an IPO allocation to a corporate fiduciary 
to whom the underwriter has given preference over some other 
potential recipient.  But such could be said of all IPO allocations to a 
corporate fiduciary,151 which then begs the question, why was the term 
“preferential” used at all?  Similarly, when the vast majority of IPO 
allocations fall to institutional investors so that it is virtually 
impossible for individual investors ever to obtain IPO shares,152 it 
would seem that any allocation of hot IPO shares to an individual 
investor would be by definition preferential.  Thus, the true question 
is, preferential with respect to whom?  This is a question that the 
language of the final judgment does not attempt to answer, and 
which ultimately may have to be addressed in future SEC regulations 
or hashed out in litigation. 
It is therefore ironic that the New York Attorney General’s press 
releases on the global resolution have spoken in such sanguine tones.  
They speak unabashedly of “[a] ban on IPO spinning,” but in the very 
same sentence, state, “investment firms will no longer be allowed to 
allocate to officers or directors of public companies preferential access 
to valuable IPO shares of corporations from which they have sought 
or obtained investment banking business.”153  If the New York 
Attorney General’s press releases are correct in declaring that the 
global resolution truly effectuates a ban on spinning, then the 
“preferential allocation” language of the final judgments should be 
read broadly to cover all IPO allocations to corporate fiduciaries, for 
anything less would not amount to a ban.154  But, of course, press 
 
 151 Indeed, anytime a corporate fiduciary receives an IPO allocation when another 
investor does not could be seen as a “preferential allocation.” 
 152 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text; supra notes 96-97 and 
accompanying text. 
 153 Press Release, Office of the New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, 
Statement by Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Regarding the “Global Resolution” of 
Wall Street Investigations (Apr. 28, 2003) (emphasis added), at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/statements/global_resolution.html (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2004). 
 154 Some might argue that the final judgments do not seek to ban those IPO 
allocations to corporate fiduciaries in which the underwriter has no expectation of 
reciprocal investment banking business from the fiduciary’s beneficiary.  See, e.g., 
supra notes 94-95, 103-07 and accompanying text.  But this interpretation of the final 
judgments would simply recreate the spinning problem.  Where an underwriter 
allocates shares of a hot IPO to a corporate officer, and that officer’s corporation 
later decides to hire the underwriter for investment banking business, how is a court 
to determine whether there was a quid pro quo, or whether the transactions were 
merely coincidental?  The parties, it is safe to say, will deny the existence of a quid 
pro quo.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  This, as will be seen, is the very 
problem that prevented successful prosecution of spinning under existing laws and 
regulations.  See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B. 
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release language is not binding on a court’s interpretation of a final 
judgement, and it is far more likely that the global resolution’s true 
effect on the practice of spinning remains open to debate (or 
litigation). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the global settlement effectively 
forecloses the practice of spinning, it nevertheless binds only ten 
investment banks.155  While it is true that these banks are some of the 
largest and most widely-recognized names in the business,156 more 
than a few prominent banks have not signed on.157  What is more, 
regional banks remain unaffected, causing some commentators to 
foresee a new “two-tier industry in which the regional firms that do 
not sign ‘have a clear advantage’ . . . .”158  In addition, the global 
resolution would not bind newly-established underwriters who were 
not parties to it, and it remains to be seen whether the global 
resolution would reach spin-offs from existing banks who are parties 
to it. 
PART IV: EXISTING ALTERNATIVES TO THE GLOBAL 
RESOLUTION 
In light of these concerns over the global resolution’s long-term 
efficacy, it is imperative that securities regulators have in place rules 
that will sustain an industry-wide ban on spinning.  Indeed, many 
observers foresee this as the SEC’s next step.159  If these rules are truly 
to curtail spinning in the future, however, rule makers must consider 
 
 155 See Smith, supra note 136. 
 156 The signatories are Bear Stearns & Co., Credit Suisse First Boston, U.S. 
Bancorp Piper Jaffray, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney, and UBS Warburg.  See Press 
Release, supra note 3. 
 157 These include Legg Mason Inc., A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., Raymond James 
Financial Inc., and a division of Mony Inc.  Robert Julavits, Will Street-Spitzer Deal Give 
Regionals an Edge?, AM. BANKER, Dec. 30, 2002, at 7; see Elstein, supra note 7 (listing 
“prominent” IPOs anticipated for December 2003, and listing Banc of America and 
BB&T—both non-signatories to the global resolution—as among the underwriters). 
 158 Julavits, supra note 157 (quoting Richard X. Bove, analyst with Hoefer & Arnett 
Inc.). 
 159 Id. (quoting Richard Bove as saying, “It’s now incumbent upon the Securities 
and Exchange Commission to straighten [concerns of a two-tier industry] out”).  The 
same article reported that securities law professor Adam Pritchard believes the SEC’s 
focus is now on implementing industry-wide regulations.  Id.  Law Professor David 
Ruder agreed that such regulatory action is necessary to prevent non-signatory banks 
from gaining an unfair advantage on signatories.  Id.  The SEC, for its part, has been 
more circumspect.  See Donaldson, Testimony, supra note 110 (stating that “[t]he 
Commission intends to evaluate the need for specific rulemaking in this area, in light 
of these and other recent Commission enforcement actions that indicate abuses in 
the IPO allocation process”). 
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how spinning escaped notice in the past.  This Part examines existing 
regulations that have proven ineffective to prevent spinning in the 
past and suggests a model for drafting new regulations to ban 
spinning.  It further examines common-law options for aggrieved 
shareholders and suggests that for such claims truly to be effective 
against spinning, courts must adopt a more aggressive stance with 
respect to finding the necessary quid pro quo.  Finally, this Part 
examines an alternative to firm commitment underwriting, the Dutch 
auction, and explains how this fledgling offering technique obviates 
many of the inefficiencies that make spinning possible under firm 
commitment underwriting. 
A. SEC, NASD, AND NYSE REGULATIONS 
Prior to an IPO, the issuer must make certain disclosures 
pursuant to Regulation S-K, Item 508.160  Item 508(a), in particular, 
requires that the issuer disclose the existence of any “material 
relationship” between the issuer and the underwriter and, further, to 
“state the nature of that relationship.”161  Given the Supreme Court’s 
broad definition of materiality in TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc.,162 one 
might suppose that past allocations of hot IPO shares by the 
underwriter to the issuer’s CEO would qualify as a material 
relationship.  Commentators generally agree, however, that absent a 
specific quid pro quo arrangement between an underwriter and a 
corporate fiduciary, spinning does not create an Item 508(a) 
“material relationship.”163  Hence, Item 508(a), like commercial 
bribery statutes, fails for want of an explicit quid pro quo.164 
 
 160 Cross & Roberts, supra note 49, at 599; see 17 C.F.R. § 229.508a (2003). 
 161 17 C.F.R. § 229.508a (2003). 
 162 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (holding that for purposes of Rule 14a-9 liability, “an 
omitted fact is material if there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote” his or her proxy); 
see Dan Childers, Securities Regulation—Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc.—Underwriter 
Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 7 J. CORP. L. 157, 158 (1981) 
(“The language of TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., stating that a fact is material if 
there is a ‘substantial likelihood’ that a reasonable person would think it important, 
is broad enough to allow courts a great deal of freedom in determining what facts are 
likely to affect a reasonable person.”) (internal citation and footnote omitted). 
 163 Cross & Roberts, supra note 49, at 599; see Maynard, supra note 22, at 2033. 
 164 See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing commercial bribery).  
Similarly, with respect to offerings made “through the selling efforts of brokers or 
dealers,” Item 508(c)(2) requires disclosure of  “the terms of any agreement, 
arrangement, or understanding” that the issuer or underwriter enters into with the 
brokers or dealers prior to the distribution.  See 17 C.F.R. § 229.508(c)(2) (2003).  
Once again, the lack of an explicit quid pro quo generally means that the 
underwriter need not disclose the fact that a recipient of hot IPO shares is also the 
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Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5 might 
serve as a basis for spinning liability.  The rule makes it unlawful for 
any person 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.165 
Clearly spinning satisfies the “in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security” element, but 10b-5 generally requires something 
more than a simple spinning transaction.166  Consider, for example, 
the 1998 cease and desist action that the SEC brought against 
investment advisor Monetta Financial Services.167  Monetta had 
received an allocation of hot IPO shares as a result of its past business 
with the underwriter.168  It then redistributed these shares to the 
personal accounts of three directors of mutual funds for which 
Monetta provided investment counseling.169  Neither Monetta nor the 
directors disclosed this transaction to the mutual funds’ shareholders, 
and the SEC subsequently brought an action for nondisclosure of a 
material fact under 10b-5.170  Ultimately, the SEC adjudged Monetta’s 
president and the mutual fund directors liable under 10b-5, but only 
by finding that Monetta and the directors breached their fiduciary 
duties to the shareholders.171 
Although a simple spinning transaction in the corporate context 
probably will not trigger 10b-5 liability, the experience of Monetta may 
suggest another potential source of liability under Rule 14a-9.172  Rule 
 
CEO of a major client.  Cross & Roberts, supra note 49, at 600. 
 165 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). 
 166 See Coffee, supra note 104 (discussing Rule 10b-5 and stating, “The simple truth 
is that investors are unlikely to consider commercial bribes paid to corporate 
executives to be material to their own investment decisions—or may even regard 
such information as bullish”). 
 167 In re Monetta Fin. Serv., Inc., 66 S.E.C. Docket 1221, 1998 WL 80239 (1998). 
 168 Id. at *4. 
 169 Id.  Professor Coffee has pointed out that the funds were legally permitted to 
purchase the hot IPO shares for themselves, thus suggesting a cause of action for 
usurpation of corporate opportunity.  Coffee, supra note 104. 
 170 In re Monetta, 1998 WL 80239, at *5. 
 171 See In re Monetta Fin. Serv., Inc., 72 S.E.C. Docket 77, 2000 WL 320457, at *15-
17 (2000). 
 172 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2003). 
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14a-9 generally prohibits management from making false or 
misleading statements or omitting to state material facts in 
communications to shareholders.173  Alluding to Monetta, Professor 
John C. Coffee, Jr. has argued that “[i]f a mutual fund’s shareholders 
have the right to know about such conflicts under Rule 10b-5 (as they 
should), so should the shareholders of a Silicon Valley corporation 
have a similar right under Rule 14a-9.”174  A search of federal 
securities cases and administrative decisions, however, turns up no 
decisions that have adopted this theory of liability. 
The NASD has weighed in with its “Free-Riding and 
Withholding” interpretation of Rule 2110.175  This rule places a 
number of limitations on the underwriter’s discretion in allocating 
hot IPO shares; for example, it forbids the underwriter from keeping 
the shares for itself176 or selling shares to employees or family 
members of employees.177  It also prohibits IPO share distributions to 
any senior officer of another investment bank.178  Although the last 
prohibition comes closest to addressing spinning, it ultimately does 
not foreclose spinning to corporate fiduciaries outside the financial 
services industry.179  Yet, as noted above, this is the NASD rule that the 
New York Attorney General and the SEC have identified as being 
violated by “preferential allocations of shares in initial public 
offerings to [corporate fiduciaries] of existing or potential 
investment banking clients.”180  To be sure, nothing in the wording of 
Rule 2110 would lead one to that conclusion, and regulatory 
authorities have not historically interpreted it as such. 
After the IPO scandal of the summer of 2002, the NASD 
unveiled its newest attempt at curbing spinning abuses: proposed rule 
2712.181  This rule would “expressly prohibit,” among other activities, 
“the allocation of IPO shares to an executive officer or director of a 
company on the condition that the officer or director send the 
company’s investment banking business to the [underwriter], or as 
 
 173 Id. 
 174 Coffee, supra note 104. 
 175 NASD Manual, supra note 50, at IM-2110-1. 
 176 Id. at IM-2110-1(b)(1).  This is withholding, as defined in note 50 and the 
accompanying text. 
 177 Id. at IM-2110-1(b)(2). 
 178 Id. at IM-2110-1(b)(4). 
 179 Id. 
 180 SSB Final Judgment, supra note 141, at 3; see text accompanying supra note 149. 
 181 See NASD Requests Comment on Proposed New Rule 2712 (IPO Allocations 
and Distributions) and on an Amendment to Rule 2710 (Corporate Financing Rule); 
Comment Period Expires September 9, 2002, NASD Notice to Members 02-55 (Aug. 
2002). 
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consideration for investment banking services previously rendered.”182  
However, the proposed language incorporates the same quid pro quo 
element183 that renders existing commercial bribery statutes 
ineffective against spinning.184  Rule 2712 would likely still allow 
underwriters broad discretion to place hot IPO shares with executives 
of corporate clients.185 
Like the NASD, the NYSE has also promulgated rules governing 
the conduct of its members.  In the recent global resolution, the SEC 
identified two rules in particular as bearing on the issue of spinning.  
Rule 401 requires that all NYSE members adhere to “principles of 
good business practice” when transacting business.186  Likewise, Rule 
476(a)(6) prohibits conduct contrary to “just and equitable 
principles of trade.”187  Given their largely indefinite nature, it is 
difficult to conceive of either of these rules as forming the gravamen 
of a complaint for alleged spinning.  Indeed, they stood as no 
obstacle to spinning in its heyday, and their chief value seems to be as 
make-weight provisions in a suit premised upon some other theory of 
liability.188 
With the foregoing standing as examples of regulations that do 
not adequately prohibit spinning, what form should any future SEC 
regulation take?  It is critical that any attempt by regulatory 
authorities to implement a ban on spinning across the industry must 
surmount the quid pro quo obstacle.  The SEC might accomplish this 
by taking its example from New York’s Martin Act.189  The Martin Act 
confers broad enforcement power on the New York Attorney General 
to prosecute fraudulent sales of securities; critically, it does not 
 
 182 Id. (emphasis added). 
 183 Terms such as “on the condition that” and “as consideration for” fall within the 
ambit of a quid pro quo, defined as “a thing that is exchanged for another thing of 
more or less equal value.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (7th ed. 1999). 
 184 See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text. 
 185 See Letter from Kenneth L. Josselyn, Chair, Capital Markets Committee of the 
Securities Industry Association, to Barbara Z. Sweeney of the Office of Corporate 
Secretary of NASD 3 (Sept. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Josselyn Letter] (emphasizing that 
the proposed rule does not prohibit placement of IPO shares to a corporate 
executive except on the condition that the executive direct future underwriting 
business to the underwriter), available at 
http://www.sia.com/2002_comment_letters/pdf/ipo.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). 
 186 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) ¶ 2401. 
 187 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) ¶ 2476. 
 188 See, for example, the final judgments in the global resolution, where the NYSE 
rules appear lumped together with NASD Rule 2110, the paramount rule for 
purposes of spinning.  See supra text accompanying note 143. 
 189 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW  §§ 352, 352(c), 353, 353-a, 359(g) (McKinney 2002). 
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require the showing of a quid pro quo.190  And, as recent experience 
has shown,191 it is an effective weapon against spinning.  But the SEC 
cannot content itself to rely on the Martin Act for all spinning 
enforcement.  For one, only the New York Attorney General can 
enforce the Martin Act; the Act has no provision for a private right of 
action.192  It is perhaps unrealistic to expect the New York Office of 
the Attorney General to be the sole sentinel against spinning.193  
Thus, the SEC should enact regulations with the flexibility and utility 
of the Martin Act, but which would allow the SEC, or even private 
attorneys general, to take enforcement action against spinning 
violations.  This objective could be relatively simple to achieve: a 
regulation flatly forbidding an underwriter from allocating IPO 
shares to a corporate fiduciary in his or her personal capacity.  To be 
sure, underwriters would likely chafe at such a prophylactic 
restriction on their otherwise broad discretion to allocate IPO 
shares.194  Yet, the New York Attorney General’s initial announcement 
of the global resolution promised just such a restriction, declaring, 
“Brokerage firms will not allocate lucrative IPO shares to corporate 
executives and directors who are in the position to greatly influence 
investment banking decisions.”195  This simple language promises 
what the final judgments and existing regulations cannot deliver: an 
 
 190 See supra note 124. 
 191 See supra note 133. 
 192 See, e.g., CPC Int’l v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. 1987). 
 193 Indeed, the New York Attorney General’s recent enforcement efforts against 
spinning were included within a much broader campaign against analyst misconduct.  
See, e.g., State Suit Seeks Repayment, supra note 78 (stating that enforcement efforts 
by the New York Attorney General against telecommunications executives who 
reaped spinning profits “grew out of a broad conflict of interest investigation into 
Wall Street brokerage firms”).  But there is no reason why analyst misconduct must 
accompany spinning; spinning can occur on a much more modest scale, 
unaccompanied by the type of lurid analyst conduct that provoked the New York 
Attorney General’s investigation.  See, e.g., Siconolfi, supra note 58, at A1 (describing 
the 1995 IPO of Pixar Animation Studios, which predated the analyst misconduct 
that provoked Attorney General Spitzer’s recent Martin Act complaint); see also 
Complaint, supra note 125.  Thus, one might fairly ask whether the New York Office 
of the Attorney General, faced with competing demands, will have the resources and 
interest to prosecute small-scale, plain-vanilla spinning transactions.  It would seem 
more appropriate that such enforcement responsibility should fall upon an authority 
dedicated to the regulation of financial markets, namely, the SEC.  See Deborah 
Solomon & Randall Smith, Donaldson Asserts SEC Authority on Markets, WALL ST. J., July 
16, 2003, at C1 (describing efforts by the SEC to “retain its standing as the nation’s 
top cop” in financial markets). 
 194 See, e.g., Josselyn Letter, supra note 185, at 3 (“Broker-dealers built on a full 
service model aspire to offer brokerage services to all employees of companies with 
whom they do business.”). 
 195 Global Resolution Press Release, supra note 1. 
  
1150 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:1121 
absolute ban on spinning that does not rely on formal proof of a quid 
pro quo. 
B. COMMON-LAW ALTERNATIVES FOR AGGRIEVED 
SHAREHOLDERS 
1. The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine. 
In a May 2002 article published in the William and Mary Law 
Review, Professor Therese H. Maynard recounted the story of Joseph 
Cayre, the former CEO of GT Software Interactive, who in 1995 
realized a $2 million profit on shares he held in the IPO of Pixar 
Animation Studios.196  Professor Maynard pointed to the unfavorable 
media coverage that followed this and similar transactions, arguing 
that a director or officer who trades in spun IPO shares subverts the 
public’s “legitimate expectations . . . as to acceptable standards of 
business ethics.”197  She urged courts to adopt and enforce a robust 
view of fiduciary duties that would require the director or officer who 
receives spun IPO shares to disclose this fact to the board before the 
board selects an underwriter for its own IPO or investment banking 
business.198  But, as Professor Maynard subtly conceded, such after-
the-fact disclosures do little to prevent the occurrence of spinning in 
the first place.199  Thus, to prevent spinning, Professor Maynard called 
for courts more rigorously to apply the common-law doctrine of 
corporate opportunity, as articulated by the Delaware state courts.200 
In light of the recent agreements on spinning, one might believe 
initially that Professor Maynard’s argument no longer bears any 
relevance to the retail investor.  However, state fiduciary duty law may 
yet play a role in the spinning saga.  Even if the recent global 
resolution proves effective in stemming the tide of spinning, it 
provides little consolation to aggrieved investors who lost their 
savings in 2000 and 2001 thanks, in large part, to the mismanagement 
of those who profited from spinning in 1998 and 1999.  One must 
assume, for example, that WorldCom stockholders and bankruptcy 
trustees would gladly accept an opportunity to recover, through legal 
action, the $11 million in personal profits that CEO Bernard Ebbers 
 
 196 Maynard, supra note 22, at 2025-26; see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying 
text. 
 197 Maynard, supra note 22, at 2061-62. 
 198 Id. at 2061. 
 199 Id. at 2064. 
 200 Id. at 2079. 
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made on spinning transactions between 1998 and 2002.201 
Furthermore, the “global” settlement is much less ambitious 
than its name implies, binding only ten brokerage firms.202  It is not 
clear that those brokerages not bound by the agreement are currently 
under any obligation to curtail their spinning practices.203  For those 
investment banks that are bound, it remains to be seen how well the 
final agreed-upon language will foreclose all of the variations on 
spinning that flourished in the late 1990s.204  In view of these caveats, 
potential litigants may yet find a review of state fiduciary duty law 
profitable.205 
* * * 
In its broadest sense, the corporate opportunity doctrine seeks 
to prevent a corporate fiduciary from usurping an opportunity for his 
or her own personal benefit that properly belongs to the corporate 
beneficiary.206  Such a “corporate opportunity” will constitute an asset 
of the corporation as against corporate fiduciaries.207  A fiduciary who 
improperly usurps a corporate opportunity holds any resulting profits 
in constructive trust for the benefit of the corporation.208 
Along with interested director transactions,209 the corporate 
opportunity doctrine is a subset of a director’s broader duty of loyalty 
to the corporation.210  Unlike interested director transactions, 
however, which are now generally governed by state statutes,211 the 
 
 201 See Smith, supra note 136 (noting that the details of the settlement “may be 
fodder for private lawsuits and arbitration cases by investors who lost money in the 
market bubble”). 
 202 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 203 See Julavits, supra note 157. 
 204 See supra Part III. 
 205 See Julavits, supra note 157 (quoting Seth Taube of the law firm of McCarter & 
English as noting that the threat of investor litigation will ultimately compel those 
firms who did not participate in the settlement to undertake many of the same 
reforms). 
 206 See Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REV. 765, 765 (1961). 
 207 Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1981). 
 208 3 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 861.50 (2002). 
 209 Eric G. Orlinsky, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Interested Director Transactions: 
A Framework for Analysis in an Attempt to Restore Predictability, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 
463 (1999) (“[A]n interested director transaction occurs when a director transacts 
business with the corporation and by the terms of the transaction takes advantage of 
the corporation.”).  By definition, spinning arises between the director and a third-
party underwriter, rather than between the director and the corporation.  See supra 
note 63 and accompanying text.  Interested director transactions are therefore 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 210 Orlinsky, supra note 209, at 453. 
 211 Id. at 453 n.5 (noting that forty-eight states have enacted interested director 
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corporate opportunity doctrine remains uncodified in every state but 
one.212  Perhaps owing in part to this common-law character, the 
doctrine has historically defied precise definition, with two 
commentators characterizing it as being “among the least satisfactory 
limbs of doctrine in the corpus of corporate law.”213  Nevertheless, 
state courts have created several tests to guide their analysis in 
determining whether an opportunity properly belongs to the 
corporation.214 
The earliest expression of the doctrine is known as the “interest 
or expectancy” test, arising from the 1900 Alabama Supreme Court 
decision of Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co.215  This test lives on in 
some states, but only in narrowly defined instances in which the 
corporation has some previously established right or interest in the 
opportunity.216  For example, in Lagarde, the corporation had been 
leasing land for its mining operations and had negotiated a contract 
to purchase a two-thirds interest in this land, when several of the 
directors purchased a full interest in the same land for their own 
competing enterprise.217  Construing the directors’ fiduciary duties to 
the corporation very narrowly, the court held that the corporation 
had a “reasonable expectancy” in the two-thirds interest, but not the 
remaining one-third interest.218  Thus, the directors had improperly 
usurped a corporate opportunity.219  As to the one-third interest that 
the corporation had not negotiated to purchase, the court found no 
usurpation of corporate opportunity, noting “[g]ood faith to the 
 
statutes and providing statutory citations). 
 212 Id. (“Curiously, no state has yet adopted a statute designed to provide guidance 
or a safe harbor for corporate opportunities.”).  The North Carolina Legislature has, 
in fact, codified the doctrine of corporate opportunity at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-31 
(2003).  See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983) (citing the 
predecessor to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-31). 
 213 Brudney & Clark, supra note 207, at 998.  The corporate opportunity doctrine 
does not appear to have achieved any greater degree of precision in other common-
law jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Lisa Peters, Corporate Opportunity—A Primer 2 (2001) 
(noting that “[t]here is no accepted statement of the doctrine”), at 
http://www.lawsonlundell.com/resources/CorporateOpportunityPaper.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2004).  The primer goes on to note a similar lack of precision in 
Canada and Australia.  Id. at 4. 
 214 See, e.g., Matthew G. Dore, The Duties and Liabilities of an Iowa Corporate Director, 
50 DRAKE L. REV. 207, 258 (2002) (citing five tests in American jurisprudence). 
 215 28 So. 199 (Ala. 1900). 
 216 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 492 (concise 8th ed. 2000) (“Insofar as the meaning of the Lagarde 
test can be determined, it is unduly narrow.”). 
 217 Lagarde, 28 So. at 200. 
 218 Id. at 201. 
 219 Id. 
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corporation does not require of its officers that they steer from their 
own use to the corporation’s benefit, enterprises, or investments 
which, though capable of profit to the corporation, have in no way 
become subjects of their trust or duty.”220 
Addressing the need for a broader construction of corporate 
opportunity, the Delaware Supreme Court formulated the next, and 
arguably the most important, test in its 1939 decision of Guth v. Loft, 
Inc.221  Guth was President of Loft, Inc., a candy and soda 
distributor.222  He also owned a soda distribution company, Grace, on 
the side.223  At the same time that Loft was searching for a cheaper 
alternative to Coca-Cola, Guth and a business associate purchased the 
Pepsi secret formula and trademark.224  Because he was short on 
funds, Guth tapped into Loft’s resources by directing Loft’s chemist 
to prepare the Pepsi concentrate for shipment to Grace.225  Grace 
then added sugar and water, and sold the syrup back to Loft at a 
considerable profit.226  Guth also utilized Loft’s money and credit to 
further the Pepsi venture and caused Loft to pay the settlement in a 
breach of contract suit between Guth and his partner in the Pepsi 
enterprise.227  Loft’s shareholders subsequently brought suit against 
Guth, and the trial court found that Guth had improperly usurped 
corporate opportunities belonging to Loft when he purchased the 
Pepsi formula and trademark, and again when he tapped into Loft’s 
assets to fund the Pepsi enterprise.228  The Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed, applying what would come to be known as the “line of 
business” test.  Broadly, the line of business test states that a director 
or officer may not take advantage of any opportunity which lies 
within the ambit of the corporation’s existing or prospective business 
activities.229  Specifically, the Delaware high court wrote: 
Where a corporation is engaged in a certain business, and an 
opportunity is presented to it embracing an activity as to which it 
has fundamental knowledge, practical experience and ability to 
pursue, which, logically and naturally, is adaptable to its business 
having regard for its financial position, and is one that is 
 
 220 Id. at 202. 
 221 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
 222 Id. at 505. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 505-06. 
 225 Id. at 506. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Guth, 5 A.2d at 507. 
 228 Id. at 507-08. 
 229 See Orlinsky, supra note 209, at 459-60. 
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consonant with its reasonable needs and aspirations for 
expansion, it may be properly said that the opportunity is in the 
line of the corporation’s business.230 
Many state courts have adopted a modified, or expanded, 
version of the line of business test that combines the Guth line of 
business test with the Lagarde interest or expectancy test.231  One 
commentator, by way of example, has represented the test employed 
by Iowa courts thus: 
[I]f there is presented to a corporate . . . director a business 
opportunity which [1] the corporation is financially able to 
undertake, [2] is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation’s 
business and is of practical advantage of it, [3] is one in which the 
corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and [4] 
by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the . . . director 
will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the law 
will not permit him to seize the opportunity for himself.232 
Whether this is in fact an expansion of the Guth line of business test is 
questionable, however, as the Guth ruling seemed to imply inclusion 
of the interest or expectancy test.233 
In 1948, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court proposed a 
third, equity-based test known as the “fundamental fairness test” in 
the case of Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc.234  Canning, a director of 
Durfee & Canning, also secretly controlled the Pacific Gas 
Corporation.235  Between 1942 and 1944, Canning caused Durfee & 
Canning to purchase large quantities of “natural gasoline” from 
Pacific Gas at a substantial markup.236  Upon learning of Canning’s 
secret profit, Durfee & Canning’s shareholders sued Canning, 
alleging breach of duty of loyalty to the corporation and seeking 
restitution.237  Canning argued that Durfee & Canning had no interest 
 
 230 Guth, 5 A.2d at 514. 
 231 See, e.g., Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary Eng’g Corp., 273 S.E.2d 112, 
117 (Ga. 1980) (discussing the “expanded ‘line of business’ test”); Dore, supra note 
214, at 259 (describing the “modified” line of business test that Iowa courts apply). 
 232 Dore, supra note 214, at 259 (quoting Lange v. Lange, 520 N.W.2d 113, 120 
(Iowa 1994)).  It must be noted, however, that Lange quotes this very language from 
Schildberg Rock Prods. Co. v. Brooks, 140 N.W.2d 132, 137 (1966), which in turn quotes 
it from Guth, 5 A.2d at 511. 
 233 See Guth, 5 A.2d at 510-11 (“It is true that when a business opportunity . . . is one 
in which [the corporation] has no interest or expectancy, the officer or director is 
entitled to treat the opportunity as his own . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 234 80 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 1948). 
 235 Id. at 526.  Canning had transferred all stock in Pacific Gas to his wife and 
daughter.  Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 527. 
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or expectancy in the gasoline,238 but the court expressly rejected the 
interest or expectancy test, writing: 
[T]he true basis of the governing doctrine rests fundamentally on 
the unfairness in the particular circumstances of a director, whose 
relation to the corporation is fiduciary, “taking advantage of an 
opportunity [for his personal profit] when the interests of the 
corporation justly call for protection. This calls for the application 
of ethical standards of what is fair and equitable [in] particular 
sets of facts.”239 
Applying this fairness standard, the court found Canning liable on 
the grounds that “Durfee & Canning was entitled to have the 
defendant as a director use his best skill in forwarding the interests of 
that corporation, and to refrain from making the secret undisclosed 
profit in question at its expense.”240  Recently, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the fundamental fairness test,241 
and courts in Alaska,242 New Hampshire,243 and North Carolina244 have 
taken similar approaches.245 
In the 1974 case of Miller v. Miller,246 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court applied a novel two-prong test, combining the line of business 
test with the fundamental fairness test “[i]n an effort hopefully to 
ameliorate the often-expressed criticism that the doctrine is vague 
and subjects today’s corporate management to the danger of 
 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 529 (quoting BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 204-05 (rev. ed. 1946)). 
 240 Durfee, 80 N.E.2d at 529. 
 241 See Demoulas v. Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 180 (Mass. 
1997). 
 242 Alvest Inc. v. Superior Oil Corp., 398 P.2d 213, 215 (Alaska 1965). 
 243 Rosenblum v. Judson Eng’g Corp., 109 A.2d 558, 562 (N.H. 1954). 
 244 Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 567-69 (N.C. 1983).  North Carolina 
presents an interesting case study because its corporate opportunity doctrine is 
statutory.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-31 (2003).  The Meiselman court, interpreting 
the predecessor statute to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-31, ruled that a fiduciary charged 
with usurping a corporate opportunity bears the burden of showing that his or her 
actions were “just and reasonable” to the corporation, and that the corporation 
would not have wanted the opportunity for itself.  Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 569. 
 245 A number of commentators would include Maryland in this category.  See 3 
FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 861.40 n.2 (2002) (citing Indep. Distributors, Inc. v. Katz, 637 
A.2d 886 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)); Orlinsky, supra note 209, at 485-86 (discussing 
Katz).  A subsequent decision by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, however, 
states unequivocally that Maryland courts follow the interest or expectancy test.  See 
Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270, 278 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (“In determining 
whether an opportunity is a corporate opportunity, Maryland follows the ‘interest or 
reasonable expectancy’ test.”). 
 246 222 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1974). 
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unpredictable liability . . . .”247  Miller was a shareholder derivative suit 
against the directors of Miller Waste, a waste packing business.248  
During World War II, in order to meet the government’s specific 
requirements for “packing and wiping waste,” the defendants 
organized a side business which purchased waste from Miller Waste, 
processed it, and sold it back at a modest profit.249  In the years 
following the war, defendants started a number of additional side 
businesses, with each business renting property from Miller Waste at 
higher than market rentals and purchasing materials from Miller 
Waste at better than fair market price.250  At trial, the court noted that 
although the market for its products had declined since World War 
II, these rentals and purchases ensured a steady increase in Miller 
Waste’s net income.251  Nevertheless, plaintiffs alleged that creation of 
these side businesses represented a usurpation of opportunities 
belonging to Miller Waste.252  Applying its novel twofold test, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed.  The first prong of the Miller 
test inquires whether there was a corporate opportunity, as defined 
by a flexible application of the Guth line of business test.253  If 
satisfied, the court then considers whether the fiduciary’s 
appropriation of the opportunity violated equitable standards of 
ethics.254  In Miller, the court found that the trial court did not err in 
finding that defendant’s side businesses were not within Miller 
Waste’s line of business as defined by Guth.255  Additionally, the court 
found that the defendants had acted in fairness and good faith and 
did not violate their duty of loyalty to Miller Waste.256  Numerous 
courts, however, have criticized the Miller approach for failing to 
bring precision and predictability to the corporate opportunity 
doctrine, arguing that Miller instead compounds the vagueness of the 
line of business test with the unpredictability of the fairness test.257  
Therefore, in addition to Minnesota, only Georgia258 and Wisconsin259 
 
 247 Id. at 81. 
 248 Id. at 72-73. 
 249 Id. at 74-75. 
 250 Id. at 77. 
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 252 Miller, 222 N.W.2d at 78. 
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 254 Id. 
 255 Id. at 82. 
 256 Id. at 83. 
 257 See, e.g., Northeast Harbor Golf Club v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Me. 
1995). 
 258 Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary Eng’g Corp., 273 S.E.2d 112, 117 (Ga. 
1980) (limiting the Miller approach to current fiduciaries only, while reserving the 
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have expressly followed Miller. 
The most recent variation on the corporate opportunity 
doctrine is the ALI test, so-named because it forms part of the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance.260  
Under the ALI test, a corporate opportunity may arise in one of three 
scenarios: (1) where a director or officer learns of an opportunity 
through his or her position with the corporation, or under 
circumstances that reasonably should cause the director or officer to 
believe that the opportunity was intended for the corporation; (2) 
where a director or officer learns of the opportunity through use of 
corporate assets; or (3) where a senior officer learns of an 
opportunity closely related to the corporation’s existing or 
prospective business.261  If an opportunity qualifies under one of the 
above circumstances, a director or officer may not take the corporate 
opportunity for himself without first disclosing the pertinent facts of 
the opportunity to the board and securing the approval of a majority 
of the disinterested board members.262  Currently, courts in just three 
states have adopted the ALI approach.263 
Leading decisions in a plurality of the states,264 most notably 
 
interest and expectancy test for former fiduciaries). 
 259 Racine v. Weisflog, 477 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
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 263 These states are Arizona (AMERCO v. Shoen, 907 P.2d 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
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Supply, Inc. v. Parrish, App. No. 88-118-II, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 724, at *6 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1988).  More recently, however, the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
has applied the line of business test.  See Schwegman v. Howard, No. M2001-00845-
COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31247084, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2002). 
 264 A survey of state case law reveals at least seventeen states whose leading 
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361 So. 2d 6 (Ala. 1978); Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1997); Broz v. 
Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996); Cohen v. Hattaway, 595 So. 2d 105 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 667 P.2d 804 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1983); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 P.3d 953 (Idaho 2003); Kirtley v. McClelland, 562 
N.E.2d 27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Lange v. Lange, 520 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1994); Urban 
J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkle, 224 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. 1949); SCD Chem. Distrib., Inc. v. 
Medley, 512 N.W.2d 86 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Hill. v. Southeastern Floor Covering 
Co., 596 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1992); Chem. Dynamics, Inc. v. Newfeld, 728 S.W.2d 590 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Grato v. Grato, 639 A.2d 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); 
Prodan v. Hemeyer, 610 N.E.2d 600 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); A. Teixeira & Co. v. 
Teixeira, 699 A.2d 1383 (R.I. 1997); Schwegman v. Howard, No. M2001-00845-COA-
R3-CV, 2002 WL 31247084, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2002); Noble v. Lubrin, 60 
P.3d 1224 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). 
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Delaware, currently follow some form of the line of business test,265 
although many courts have struggled over how broadly to construe a 
corporation’s line of business.266  For instance, it is not immediately 
clear that the purchase of securities falls within a corporation’s line of 
business.267  Some courts have held that a director or officer who 
purchases shares of outstanding stock in the corporation may be 
liable for usurpation of an opportunity properly belonging to the 
corporation.268  By contrast, some courts have declined to find liability 
under similar facts.269  Most legal authorities draw a distinction 
between a director or officer purchasing stock in the corporation as 
opposed to purchasing stock in outside investment opportunities,270 
although many large corporations do regularly invest corporate funds 
in equities markets.271 
The Delaware Supreme Court has recently provided some 
guidance with its 1996 decision of Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, 
Inc.272  Reaffirming the basic principle underlying the Guth line of 
business test, the court elucidated several factors which must be 
 
 265 Accord PAT K. CHEW, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY 99 (1994) (“The most 
widely used test is the line of business test, as described in Guth v. Loft, Inc.”). 
 266 See, e.g., Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me. 
1995) (noting that “the question whether a particular activity is within a 
corporation’s line of business is conceptually difficult to answer”). 
 267 See generally Annotation, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by Director or Officer as 
Usurpation of “Corporate Opportunity,” 16 A.L.R. 4th 784 (1982). 
 268 See, e.g., Farclas v. City Vending Co., 194 A.2d 298 (Md. 1963) (finding liability 
where the corporation has declared a policy to buy back outstanding stock); Kelly v. 
74 & 76 W. Tremont Ave. Corp., 146 N.E.2d 795 (N.Y. 1956) (finding liability where 
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for himself at a time when the corporation did not have sufficient capital to do so 
itself); Lash v. Lash Furniture Co., 296 A.2d 207 (Vt. 1972) (finding liability where 
director voted at a board meeting to reject the opportunity to buy back stock but 
later purchased it for himself). 
 269 See, e.g., Northwestern Terra Cotta Corp. v. Wilson, 219 N.E.2d 860 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1966) (declining to find liability where director had purchased, for $7 per 
share, shares for which the corporation had previously bid $5 per share); Zidell v. 
Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1091 (Or. 1977) (declining to find liability where plaintiff 
shareholder failed to prove that corporation had contemplated purchasing stock or 
had done so in the past). 
 270 See, e.g., Recent Case, Director’s Liability Broadened to Include Usurpation of 
Opportunity Merely Advantageous to Investment Trust, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 424, 426 (1955) 
(noting that a decision to hold the director of an investment trust liable for 
usurpation of corporate opportunity when he purchased for himself outside patent 
rights represented an extension of the traditional doctrine that “merely 
advantageous” investment opportunities were not corporate opportunities). 
 271 See, e.g., MCLEODUSA, INC., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT F-3, F-12 (2002) (describing a 
$64.7 million “investment in available-for-sale securities” in 2000 and a $934.1 million 
investment in liquid securities in 1999). 
 272 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996). 
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satisfied for an opportunity to qualify as a corporate opportunity: 
(1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; 
(2) the opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; 
(3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the 
opportunity; and (4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the 
corporate fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position inimicable 
to his duties to the corporation.273 
But even where a corporate opportunity exists, a corporate fiduciary 
may take the opportunity as his or her own if 
(1) the opportunity is presented to the director or officer in his 
individual and not his corporate capacity; (2) the opportunity is 
not essential to the corporation; (3) the corporation holds no 
interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) the director or 
officer has not wrongfully employed the resources of the 
corporation in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity.274 
In her recent article, Professor Maynard suggested that the Broz 
factors translate to the spinning context with little difficulty.275  
Specifically, she argued that a trier of fact could find that the 
allocation of hot IPO shares to a CEO’s personal trading account was 
a result of the CEO’s position in a company known widely within the 
investment banking community to be a significant consumer of 
financial services.276  Although conceding that investing in a hot IPO 
is probably not essential to the corporation,277 Professor Maynard did 
argue that the corporation’s interest in the opportunity trumps that 
of the corporate fiduciary, since the corporation ultimately will be the 
consumer of subsequent investment banking business.278  Thus, a trier 
of fact “balancing the equities of [the] individual case”279 could 
reasonably find a corporate fiduciary’s spinning transaction to be a 
usurpation of corporate opportunity under the Broz line of business 
analysis.280 
Professor Maynard’s analysis certainly bears merit, but its 
greatest weakness lies in the need for a trier of fact to find what 
essentially amounts to a quid pro quo.  Specifically, the jury must find 
that the recipient of the hot IPO shares received those shares 
 
 273 Id. at 155. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Maynard, supra note 22, at 2078 (noting that the Broz decision is “quite 
helpful” in the spinning context). 
 276 Id. at 2079-80. 
 277 Id. at 2080. 
 278 Id. at 2081. 
 279 Broz, 673 A.2d at 155. 
 280 Maynard, supra note 22, at 2081. 
  
1160 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:1121 
precisely because he or she was a fiduciary of a potential corporate 
client—not because he or she, in an individual capacity, was a favored 
client of the underwriter.  Thus, using the Joseph Cayre example 
mentioned earlier, Professor Maynard asserts that “[b]ecause the 
opportunity came to Mr. Cayre as a result of his position within the 
company, this is powerful evidence that this investment opportunity 
constituted a corporate opportunity.”281  But this assumes that the 
opportunity did in fact devolve to Mr. Cayre because he was the CEO 
of GT Software Interactive.  Certainly, however, Mr. Cayre would 
argue in litigation that he received the opportunity in his individual 
capacity as a wealthy investor and potential customer of the 
underwriter.282  Professor Maynard suggests that a trier of fact 
“balancing the equities of an individual case” could surmount this 
obstacle.283  This may indeed pose a lower hurdle than formal proof 
of a quid pro quo under a commercial bribery statute,284 but it 
nevertheless suggests a loophole through which spinning could slip 
unabated. 
2. Agency Principles. 
One may also think of spinning as a type of kickback.285  This 
characterization is particularly apt in light of a variation on spinning 
that CSFB allegedly practiced.  In early 2002, the SEC and NASD 
charged CSFB with underpricing IPOs and allocating shares to select 
hedge funds.286  The hedge funds would then flip the shares in the 
aftermarket and pay a percentage of the resulting profits back to 
CSFB through inflated commissions on unrelated stock trades.287  
CSFB ultimately settled the charges and paid a $100 million fine 
without admitting any wrongdoing.288  Nevertheless, the scenario 
 
 281 Id. at 2079-80. 
 282 See Siconolfi, supra note 58, at A1 (recounting how Sanford Robertson, 
principal of the underwriter that allocated Pixar IPO shares to Mr. Cayre in 1995—
an allocation that generated a $2 million profit for Mr. Cayre—claimed that the 
underwriter had made the allocation because Mr. Cayre was a “very, very good 
client”). 
 283 Maynard, supra note 22, at 2081 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 284 See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text. 
 285 See Letters to the Editor, supra note 122 (“It is obvious that spin shares amount 
to a high-tech pre-emptive kick-back at best . . . .”). 
 286 See Smith & Pulliam, supra note 80.  A hedge fund is “[a] specialized 
investment group—usu. organized as a limited partnership or offshore investment 
company—that offers the possibility of high returns through risky techniques such as 
selling short or buying derivatives.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 727 (7th ed. 1999). 
 287 Smith & Pulliam, supra note 80. 
 288 Id. 
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vividly illustrates a kickback in practice.289 
In the CSFB example, the hedge funds allegedly paid the 
kickback to the underwriter.  But a kickback may also occur when an 
agent of the principal receives secret remuneration.  The Maryland 
Court of Appeals decision in Green v. H & R Block, Inc.290 illustrates 
this concept.  Green was a taxpayer who solicited H & R Block 
(“Block”) to prepare her taxes.291  She elected to take advantage of 
Block’s “Rapid Anticipation Loan” program, whereby Block would 
arrange for her to receive a loan from a third-party lender in the 
amount of her anticipated tax refund.292  Block, however, neglected to 
disclose that it received a fee, or “kickback,” from the lender for each 
loan the lender made as a result of Block’s referral.293  Thus, Green 
sued Block for breaching its fiduciary obligations to its customers by 
failing to disclose its secret profit.294 
The court found that Block was Green’s agent for purposes of 
preparing Green’s taxes.295  Accordingly, fiduciary duty law required 
that Block disclose the side payments it received from the lender.296  
Because it failed to make the necessary disclosures, allowing its 
customers reasonably to believe that it was acting as their “broker” in 
securing the most favorable loan terms,297 Block breached its fiduciary 
duty to Green.298  Moreover, the court noted that where the agent 
breaches its principal-agent relationship, it is not necessary for the 
principal to allege that she had suffered actual harm.299 
As it turns out, the Green analysis translates well to the standard 
spinning context.  Just as the court found that Green was the 
principal and Block the agent, so too is a CEO an agent of the 
 
 289 See Coffee, supra note 30 (arguing that this general scenario involves an illegal 
side payment that rises to the level of a commercial bribe). 
 290 735 A.2d 1039 (Md. 1999). 
 291 Id. at 1043-44. 
 292 Id. at 1044. 
 293 Id. at 1045. 
 294 Id.  Green was actually the named plaintiff in a class representing all of Block’s 
Maryland customers.  Id. at 1043. 
 295 Id. at 1049. 
 296 Green, 735 A.2d at 1056. 
 297 Id. at 1054. 
 298 Id. at 1057. 
 299 Id. (quoting Mechem Outlines Agency as stating, “It makes no difference that the 
principal has not been injured, or that the agent has given him as good terms as 
anybody would, or even perhaps better terms, or that the sale or purchase has been 
at the price fixed by the principal; or that there was no bad faith or intention to 
defraud . . . .”). 
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corporate principal.300  And just as Block owed to Green a duty to 
disclose any side profits it received arising from the scope of its 
agency, the CEO must also disclose to the board any profits it receives 
within the scope of agency.301  But herein lies the problem, for it is 
not immediately evident that a CEO who receives a hot IPO 
allocation does so in his or her capacity as an agent of the 
corporation.  Indeed, most CEOs would argue that they received the 
shares in their capacity as an individual investor (who just happened 
also to be a corporate fiduciary).  On the other hand, a large body of 
circumstantial evidence suggests that a reasonable jury could indeed 
find that the CEO received a personal allocation of hot IPO shares in 
his or her capacity as a corporate decision maker.302  The 
inaccessibility of hot IPO shares to ordinary retail investors, coupled 
with the free availability of these same shares to certain individuals, 
such as WorldCom and Qwest executives, adds weight to this 
argument. 
C. THE DUTCH AUCTION APPROACH TO INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FIRM 
COMMITTMENT UNDERWRITING 
This Comment has described a species of underwriting 
commonly known as the “firm commitment” method303 and has 
explained how unscrupulous participants may abuse this method to 
perpetrate the practice of spinning.  Firm commitment underwriting 
is only one of several possible offering methods,304 however, and some 
commentators of late have questioned whether it is truly the best 
one.305  One alternative in particular, the “Dutch auction” method, 
 
 300 See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 8.01, at 117 (2003) 
(“The officers of a corporation are in legal theory the agents of the corporation.”); 2 
FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 266 (1998) (distinguishing between officers and “mere 
agents,” but stating that officers do have agent status). 
 301 3 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 884 (2002) (stating that directors and officers 
“cannot, either directly or indirectly, in their dealings on behalf of the corporation 
with others, or in any other transaction in which they are under a duty to guard the 
interests of the corporation, make any profit, or acquire any other personal benefit 
or advantage, not also enjoyed by the other shareholders”). 
 302 See, e.g., Mills, supra note 36, at H1 (admitting that some investors get hot IPO 
shares “as a kind of favor, to get them to continue doing more long-term business 
with Merrill [Lynch]”). 
 303 See supra notes 29, 31. 
 304 See generally 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 322-85 (describing strict 
underwriting, firm commitment underwriting, best efforts underwriting, competitive 
bidding, and shelf registration). 
 305 William R. Hambecht, principal of W.R. Hambrecht & Co., has been a vocal 
supporter of the Dutch auction method and currently offers the service through his 
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has garnered new interest in recent years306 as a possible challenger to 
the more traditional—and arguably more abuse-prone—firm 
commitment method. 
1. The Dutch Auction Defined. 
The Dutch auction is an open bidding process in which the 
issuer announces its intention to offer a fixed quantity of shares and 
solicits bids from investors who are interested in participating.307  
Each potential investor submits a bid specifying how many shares he 
or she is willing to buy and at what price, and these bids become 
irrevocable and binding at the close of the bidding period.308  At that 
time, the issuer will have received a range of bids, some offering to 
buy large quantities of shares at very low prices, and others offering 
high prices for just a few shares.309  Next, the issuer will arrange the 
bids in descending order of price and will accept the highest bid first, 
then the next highest bid, and so forth.310  Eventually, the issuer will 
arrive at the bid that depletes the shares in the offering.311  This bid 
determines the “clearing price,”312 which is the price that the 
accepted bidders will pay for their shares.313  The issuer rejects all bids 
below the clearing price and accepts all higher bids at the clearing 
price.314 
 
firm.  See infra note 341; see also Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1381 
(“[C]orporations should be encouraged to experiment with securities auctions.”). 
 306 See McNamee, supra note 98 (discussing Hambrecht’s Dutch auction method); 
Nick Wingfield, Deals & Deal Makers: Hambrecht’s IPO Method Is in Dutch, WALL ST. J., 
July 31, 2002, at C1 (describing Hambrecht’s method of conducting Dutch auctions 
via the Internet). 
 307 See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 218 (1997).  Bidders may be 
individuals, institutional investors, or broker-dealers.  See Exxon Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,171, at 
88,006 (May 5, 1977) [hereinafter Exxon No-Action Letter]. 
 308 COX ET AL., supra note 307, at 218. 
 309 Although most authorities on the subject do not expressly address such 
situations, it is theoretically possible that a bidder may bid a low price for a small 
number of shares, or a high price for a large number of shares.  In the former 
instance, the bid will likely have no effect on the auction, as it will fall below the 
clearing price.  See infra note 312.  Conversely, the bidder in the latter situation can 
expect that its bid will be successful, as its bid likely will fall above the clearing price.  
Id. 
 310 COX ET AL., supra note 307, at 218. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Wingfield, supra note 306, at C1 (stating that the “clearing price” is the highest 
price at which all of the shares in the offering may be sold). 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. (“The lowest price accepted by the issuer through this process is the price 
paid by all the bidders whose bids were accepted through the process.”). 
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The idea of using a Dutch auction for public offerings of 
corporate securities is a relatively recent idea in the United States.315  
A subsidiary of Exxon first drew attention to the method in 1977 
when it proposed to issue debt securities (bonds) using a Dutch 
auction.316  The SEC gave its blessing in the form of a no-action 
letter,317 thus paving the way for the successful 1982 auction of $135 
million in debentures.318  Similar auctioning methods have enjoyed 
broader use in Great Britain in the form of “offers for sale by 
tender,”319 as well as in France.320 
2.  Theoretical Justifications for the Dutch Auction IPO. 
In the aftermath of recent IPO allocation scandals, the 
theoretical appeal of the Dutch auction method is obvious.  First, the 
Dutch auction greatly simplifies the job of the underwriter,321 to the 
extent the issuer even requires an underwriter at all.  Some 
commentators have suggested, for example, that the issuer itself 
would be perfectly capable of soliciting and evaluating bids, perhaps 
by appealing directly to potential investors through advertising 
media.322  Direct investor solicitation raises the specter of a 
registration violation,323 so the issuer may still need an intermediary to 
communicate with individual investors.324  Even so, the Dutch auction 
removes one of the underwriter’s most time-consuming and error 
prone tasks, namely, valuation.325  A 1996 Practicing Law Institute 
publication described firm commitment underwriting thus: “During 
 
 315 The U.S. Treasury, however, regularly auctions government securities.  See 
Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1381, 1386 n.23. 
 316 Exxon No-Action Letter, supra note 307; see COX ET AL., supra note 307, at 218. 
 317 Exxon No-Action Letter, supra note 307. 
 318 See Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1388 (stating that the auction 
obtained a better price than comparable Treasury securities). 
 319 Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1389. 
 320 See Benveniste & Busaba, supra note 37, at 385. 
 321 See Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1389-90. 
 322 See, e.g., id. at 1391 (“[A]uctions bypass the process of negotiating the price 
with an underwriter and allow the issuer to poll the market directly to see what the 
securities are worth.”). 
 323 Specifically, § 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 generally prohibits investor 
solicitation by means of any writing that may be deemed an offer to sell a security 
before a registration statement has been filed for that security.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
77e(b)(1) (2002). 
 324 See Yi, supra note 34, at 246 (discussing the general prohibition on direct 
solicitation of individual investors during the waiting period, the period between the 
filing of a securities registration statement with the SEC and the time at which the 
registration becomes effective); supra note 36. 
 325 Accord Mills, supra note 36, at H1 (describing the wrangling that usually occurs 
between issuer and underwriter when setting the offer price). 
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the IPO process, the investment bankers refine their valuation 
analysis to incorporate the changing business conditions and stock 
market environment.  Ultimately, however, investor demand 
determines the final IPO valuation.”326  Underwriters devote much of 
the roadshow to trying to read the tealeaves of market demand.327  
The Dutch auction achieves the same result—a valuation determined 
by investor demand—albeit in a more direct, efficient manner.  By 
the very act of bidding in a Dutch auction, investors are explicitly 
stating their demand.328 
With efficiencies in valuation come efficiencies in underwriter 
fees.  At least one commentator has argued that firm commitment 
underwriters price their services supracompetitively.329  Charging 
supracompetitive fees, the commentator argued, is equivalent to 
underpricing an IPO, and underpricing may in fact be symptomatic 
of a lack of market competition for underwriting services.330  The 
Dutch auction, by simplifying the IPO process and allowing the issuer 
itself to assess demand, reduces the scope of the underwriter’s 
services and introduces greater competition into the underwriter 
bidding process.331  To the extent that an underwriting syndicate no 
longer needs to purchase the issuer’s entire offering in order to 
effect a distribution, the underwriter’s discount would also no longer 
be necessary.332 
As a practical matter, issuers may want to seek out the services of 
an underwriter to manage the auction.333  But even assuming the 
 
 326 Crocker, supra note 15, at 390. 
 327 See Benveniste & Busaba, supra note 37, at 390. 
 328 Generically stated, demand is the “intensity of buyer pressure on the 
availability and cost of a commodity or service.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 441 (7th 
ed. 1999).  A bid, as in a Dutch auction, manifests demand as an “offer to pay a 
specified price for something that may or may not be for sale.”  Id. at 153. 
 329 See Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1391. 
 330 Id. at 1390-91 (discussing the possibility that underwriters “possess some 
market power to extract supracompetitive fees,” such as collusion or oligopolistic 
behavior). 
 331 Id. at 1391. 
 332 See supra note 53. 
 333 See Wingfield, supra note 306 (using the example of W.R. Hambrecht & Co.).  
The 1933 Securities Act defines an underwriter as: 
[A]ny person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or 
offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any 
security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any 
such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or 
indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term shall not 
include a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an 
underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary 
distributors’ or sellers’ commission. 
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issuer retains an underwriter to conduct the auction, the Dutch 
auction eliminates the conflict of interest inherent in firm 
commitment underwriting, namely the underwriter’s incentive to 
underprice.334  First, because the firm commitment underwriter 
agrees to purchase all of the IPO shares from the issuer and place 
them with (i.e., sell them to) subscribers, the underwriter runs the 
risk that it will not be able to resell them for a profit.335  To minimize 
this risk, the underwriter has an incentive to price the offering below 
market demand so that complete resale is assured and the offering is 
oversubscribed.336  Second, the lavish underpricing of the late 1990s 
suggests another factor at work, namely the intangible benefits that 
accrue to the underwriter through selective distributions of hot IPO 
shares.  In the Dutch auction, these incentives are eliminated because 
competitive bidding determines the offering price, not the 
underwriter.337  The result is a more accurate valuation of the IPO 
and greater capitalization for the issuer. 
The Dutch auction method promotes accurate valuation in 
another way.  Ordinarily, bidders who are influenced by a desire to 
pay as little as possible may understate their demand by submitting 
low bids.  But because the issuer in a Dutch auction IPO accepts all 
bids at the cutoff price, the price that bidders pay does not necessarily 
correspond to the price they bid.338  Thus, bidders have an incentive 
to bid what the IPO shares are actually worth to them, since 
understating demand lessens the likelihood that the issuer will accept 
their bid.339 
Further efficiencies arise from the fact that Dutch auction IPOs 
generally involve more bidders than traditional IPOs.340  Unlike firm 
commitment underwriting, which tends to exclude all but a handful 
of select investors, Dutch auctions are generally open to all qualified 
 
15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (2002).  As courts construe this definition broadly, a company 
that manages a Dutch auction probably meets the definition of an underwriter.  See 
1A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 222.10 (2002) (noting that the definition is broad and 
encompasses “any one who purchases stock from the issuer with a view to resell to 
the public”); see also supra notes 323, 324 (noting the constraints of § 5(b)(1), which 
may require an intermediary between the issuer and investors). 
 334 See Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1390; supra notes 43-45 and 
accompanying text. 
 335 Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1390. 
 336 Id. 
 337 Id. at 1391. 
 338 Id. at 1385. 
 339 Id. 
 340 Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1385. 
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investors.341  Allowing greater participation in the offering ensures a 
more competitive bidding process and should, in theory, result in a 
more accurate valuation.342 
Dutch auctions also eliminate the need for underwriter 
discretion when allocating IPO shares.343  Bids, not the underwriter, 
determine who comes away from the IPO with shares.344  Thus, even if 
a Dutch auction does not operate efficiently, and an undervalued 
IPO results,345 the underwriter nevertheless will be unable to spin 
those hot IPO shares to favored clients. 
Finally, a company may auction off debt or equity entirely 
through electronic media, such as the Internet.346  This is a highly 
relevant consideration in view of the geometric proliferation of 
financial services offered over the Internet since the mid-1990s.347  
The firm of W.R. Hambrecht & Co. has been the leading proponent 
for the use of this technology in auctioning corporate equity 
securities.348  Some observers predict that its compatibility with 
emerging technologies will cause the Internet-based Dutch to auction 
eventually become the IPO method of choice.349 
 
 341 See, for example, W.R. Hambrecht & Co.’s description of its OpenIPO® 
process, at http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/index.html, 
which states, “Qualified investors, whether institutions or individuals, have equal 
access to bid on IPO shares through our OpenIPO auction.” 
 342 See Bill Hambrecht, Fixing the IPO Process (Sept. 2002) (“Final pricing would be 
based on the order information . . . .”), at http://www.wrhambrecht.com 
/ind/strategy/bill_pov/200209/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). 
 343 The W.R. Hambrecht & Co. web page, supra note 341, alludes to this point by 
noting, “Shares are allocated in an equal and impartial way by the auction process. 
There is no preferential allocation.” 
 344 See Hambrecht, supra note 342 (“Final pricing would be based on the order 
information . . . .”). 
 345 This result has occurred in practice.  See infra notes 364-65. 
 346 See, e.g., Bear, Stearns & Co.  Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [2000 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,887, at 77,100 (July 20, 2000) (describing Bear 
Stearns’ Internet-based Dutch auction for investment-grade bonds); CapitaLink 
Securities Corp. & CapitaLink Bond Auctions, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 
286361, at *1 (Apr. 10, 1990) (“Since 1986, CapitaLink has completed the 
development of the technology necessary to permit it to conduct electronic Dutch 
auctions of securities . . . .”). 
 347 See Nancy C. Libin & James S. Wrona, The Securities Industry and the Internet: A 
Suitable Match?, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 601, 602-03 (noting that online brokerage 
accounts have increased from 1.5 million in 1996 to more than twenty-three million 
at the end of 2000, and further noting a study purporting to show that eighteen 
percent of all investors had bought or sold securities over the Internet by January 
2000). 
 348 See Wingfield, supra note 306. 
 349 See, e.g., id. (quoting Chris Mottern, chief executive of a company that went 
public via Dutch action, as saying, “My belief is maybe five or six years from now, this 
is the way IPOs are going to happen”). 
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3. Drawbacks to the Dutch Auction IPO. 
The allure of the Dutch auction IPO depends largely on 
perspective, and many of the same features that make it highly 
attractive to some make it equally repugnant to others.  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that traditional underwriters have been less 
than enthusiastic about the prospect of their obsolescence, or at the 
very least, diminished fees.350  Part of this resistance is cultural, as 
Dutch auction promoter William Hambrecht candidly admitted in a 
July 2002 Wall Street Journal article.351  For many corporations seeking 
to go public, an IPO with a brand-name underwriter is a sign of 
prestige and status, and an important achievement in the life of the 
issuer.352  Underwriters, too, share this sentiment.353  For many 
investment banks, serving as lead underwriter in a public offering has 
long been, and remains, a matter of intense pride and competition.354 
In addition to prestige, traditional IPOs—in particular, hot 
IPOs—radiate pecuniary benefits to all who participate.  Beyond 
simply their discount, underwriters may benefit through a number of 
more questionable means, such as spinning.  Moreover, officers and 
directors of the issuer may profit from large first-day trade ups 
through their own holdings in IPO shares and stock options.355  
Spinning aside, many view these benefits as time-honored perquisites, 
and a legitimate by-product of the IPO process. 
Throughout the 1990s, explosive IPOs also provided invaluable 
media coverage for start-ups trying to establish a presence on the dot-
com landscape.  Commentators to this day talk, usually with a mixture 
of awe and revulsion, about the spectacular December 1999 IPO of 
VA Software Corporation, which closed up 698 percent at the end of 
 
 350 See Wingfield, supra note 306, at C1 (noting that “established Wall Street firms 
have resisted using Dutch auctions”). 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. (quoting William Hambrecht as saying, “When I started in this business, the 
ultimate thing for you as a company was to go public with Morgan Stanley.  That just 
hasn’t died”). 
 353 See LISA ENDLICH, GOLDMAN SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS ix (1999) 
(describing the 1956 IPO of Ford Motor Company as “one of [Goldman Sachs’s] 
greatest triumphs”). 
 354 See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 325 (1990) 
(describing the “powerful symbolic significance” of being designated the lead 
underwriter in bond offerings). 
 355 See Alan Murray, Let Capital Markets, Not Financial Firms, Govern Fate of IPOs, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2002, at A4 (quoting investor advocate Nell Minow as saying, “If 
you’re 25 years old and operating out of your garage and somebody offers you tens 
of millions of dollars, are you going to quibble?”). 
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its first trading day.356  Orchestrating an éclat of this magnitude may 
provide sufficient intangible benefits to the issuer (as in the form of 
media attention or analyst coverage) to justify the lost capitalization.  
But the long-term benefits are much less assured.  Consider that as of 
February 2004, a share of VA Linux stock, which closed at almost 
$240 on its first trading day in December 1999, was trading at less 
than four dollars.357  Thus, the traditional mantra that firm 
commitment underwriters use to justify underpricing—that their goal 
is to “seek the highest sustainable valuation rather than the highest 
attainable valuation”358—often is not borne out in practice. 
4. The Dutch Auction IPO in Practice. 
How have Dutch auction IPOs fared in practice?  Regrettably, 
the bellwether underwriter, W.R. Hambrecht & Co., has taken only 
nine companies public by Dutch auction since it first offered the 
service in 1999.359  This rather sparse track record, however, may be 
more a reflection of the current market for IPOs, which is weak, than 
an indication of issuer disinterest.  For their part, those issuers who 
have chosen Hambrecht’s Dutch auction IPO—ranging in size from 
the $11.5 million April 1999 IPO of Ravenswood Winery to the $86 
million December 1999 IPO of Andover.net—generally report 
satisfaction with the process.360  Issuers in the United Kingdom who 
have offered securities through the issue for sale by tender similarly 
commend the more accurate valuations and lower underwriters’ 
discounts.361 
If markets were perfectly efficient,362 one would expect no jump 
in price on the first day of trading after a Dutch auction IPO.363  In 
 
 356 See, e.g., Maynard, supra note 22, at 2024. 
 357 Stock quote as of Feb. 26, 2004: $3.79. 
 358 Crocker, supra note 15, at 390. 
 359 See Completed OpenIPOs, web page of W.R. Hambrecht & Co., at 
http://www.wrhambrecht.com/ind/auctions/openipo/completed.html (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2004). 
 360 See Kate Kelly, Small Stocks Focus: Peet’s IPO Manages a 17% Rise on Down Day for 
Nasdaq Stocks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2001, at C6 (quoting Peet’s Coffee & Tea CEO 
Chris Mottern as saying, “We’re pleased with the results”). 
 361 Auctioning New Issues, supra note 43, at 1389 n.51 (reporting that an “average 
market discount is about six percent for offers for sale by tender, as compared to 
17% for offers for sale”). 
 362 The efficient market hypothesis posits that security prices in a perfectly 
efficient market are instantly responsive to the introduction of new information, and 
therefore reflect all available information at any given time.  See REILLY & NORTON, 
supra note 5, at 215. 
 363 See Simon Avery & Kate Kelley, Signs of Life: Simplex IPO Jumps 77% in Best First-
Day “Pop” Since November, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2001, at C16 (noting that the 0.37% first 
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practice, markets are somewhat less than efficient, and Hambrecht’s 
actual results have varied from a twenty-two percent first-day decline 
for the May 2000 IPO of Nogatech, Inc.,364 to the surprising 252 
percent first-day gain for Andover.net.365  Yet the experience of 
Andover.net, which went public around the time of the record-setting 
VA Software IPO, demonstrates that even Dutch auctions can yield 
inefficient results in exceptionally hot IPO markets.  Indeed, this fact 
may help assuage those who argue that Dutch auction IPOs simply 
cannot garner enough media attention, nor generate enough 
investor profits, to pose a serious challenge to firm commitment 
underwriting. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the rampant IPO market of the 1990s, spinning 
proliferated.  Spinning is a by-product of inefficiencies inherent in 
firm commitment underwriting, the most common form of IPO 
underwriting in the United States today.  The often imprecise art of 
IPO valuation, coupled with nearly absolute underwriter discretion in 
allocating IPO shares to select investors, and fueled by intense public 
demand for IPO shares, creates an environment in which hot IPO 
shares become a currency for funding questionable underwriter 
business practices.  Many commentators have argued, for example, 
that spinning is nothing more than a corporate bribe, and that it 
encourages officers and directors to breach their fiduciary duties. 
Under the auspices of a global resolution of investigations into 
analyst conflicts of interest, the New York Attorney General and the 
SEC have taken an important first step toward creating an 
environment in which spinning is not tolerated.  But vagaries in the 
language of the final judgments leave questions unanswered and 
undermine the strong condemnation that regulatory authorities 
purport to send.  Non-signatories to the settlement may still engage 
in spinning, and even signatories may have colorable arguments that 
certain spinning activities do not violate the terms of the final 
judgments.  Meanwhile, existing laws and regulations have proven 
ineffective at curbing IPO allocation abuses, New York’s Martin Act 
standing as a possible exception.  This Comment has argued that the 
 
day increase of the Briazz Dutch auction IPO “speaks to the theory behind the 
Dutch-auction system: If shares are valued accurately before the IPO, they won’t 
skyrocket on the first day of trading”). 
 364 See Terzah Ewing, New Focus IPO Opens Strong, Bucking Trend, WALL ST. J., May 
19, 2000, at C18. 
 365 Kelly, supra note 360, at C6. 
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SEC should take a page from New York’s book by enacting spinning 
regulations patterned after the Martin Act, requiring no quid pro 
quo. 
Even if the SEC ultimately decides not to take the lead in 
regulating spinning before it occurs, courts can and should become 
more active in finding liability after the fact.  Broader application of 
existing securities regulations, for instance, would require 
underwriters to provide greater disclosure and thereby discourage 
spinning.  Furthermore, aggressive application of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine would be an effective deterrent of spinning if 
corporate fiduciaries were suddenly to find themselves liable for 
spinning profits they received in their service to the corporation.  
Similarly, state agency law suggests a possible remedy against agents 
of the corporation who receive undisclosed compensation from a 
third-party underwriter while acting in their official capacity. 
Finally, it may be time to look beyond merely addressing the 
symptoms of IPO underwriting inefficiencies, such as spinning, and 
take a more holistic approach.  Firm commitment underwriting, for 
all of its convolutions, is merely a process for gauging and fulfilling 
market demand.  Dutch auction IPOs achieve the same result, but in 
a much more efficient manner and at lower cost to the issuer.  Fees 
that the issuer would pay to the firm commitment underwriter for 
valuation and allocation services instead inure to the Dutch auction 
issuer as increased capitalization from the IPO.  And because 
spinning owes its existence to inefficiencies in IPO valuation and 
allocation, the Dutch auction approach, to borrow a phrase from the 
antitrust context, catches the weed in the seed and keeps it from 
coming to flower.366 
Admittedly, the Dutch auction is an idealistically sanguine 
approach to IPO allocations, perhaps better suited to the sensibilities 
of European capital markets than to the slings and arrows of Wall 
Street.  But in the absence of further SEC regulation and more 
aggressive application of common-law theories of liability, it may 
represent the truest alternative to the prevailing culture of spinning.  
And amidst the fallout of IPO abuses like those of the late 1990s, 
mounting public, legal, and regulatory pressure may indeed tip the 
balance in favor of a new way of doing business. 
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